book

 

 

21st Century’s Mahābhārata

 

 

 

 

BY: Dr. GOPAL RAYAPPA KOLEKAR

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dedication

* * *

 

This book is dedicated to the community of the
21st century.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

© All Rights Reserved

 

21st Century’s Mahābhārata

By Dr. Gopal Rayappa Kolekar

A Book in English.

Under the Indian Copyright Act, all rights of the contents of this book are reserved with the author, Dr. Gopal Rayappa Kolekar. No part of this book, including the name, title, design, inside matter or photographs, may be reproduced or copied in any form or by any means, in whole or in part, in any language. Breach of any of these conditions is liable to legal action.

All disputes are subject to the jurisdiction of Bangalore courts.

 

First Edition:  November 2024

ISBN

 

 

Published by:

Gopal Rayappa Kolekar

Lane: Patil Galli, Post: Kangrali B.K.

Taluka and District: Belagavi: 590 010

State: Karnataka, India.

Email: gopalkolekar@yahoo.com

 

 

 

 

AN INTRODUCTION TO Dr. GOPAL KOLEKAR
- a multi-faceted author

Dr. Gopal Rayappa Kolekar, born on August 14, 1972, in the quaint village of Kangrali B.K. in Belagavi, Karnataka, India, is an eminent author and Mechanical Engineer. His academic journey began in his hometown, where he completed his Primary and High School education. Driven by a passion for engineering, he graduated as a
Mechanical Engineer from a college in Belagavi.

Despite English being a foreign language, Dr. Kolekar recognizes its significance in scientific discourses. His literary contributions include ten books in English, each delving into diverse realms of knowledge and societal concerns. Notably, he explores the educational landscape in developing countries like India, contemplating the structure and reforms required in the face of contemporary challenges.

In his works, Dr. Kolekar extends beyond conventional themes. Amidst the backdrop of global issues such as mass terrorism and pervasive hatred leading to endless wars, he articulates his views on the principles that should administer contemporary governance. According to him, a liberal approach, inspired by Christ's message, should guide the central power.

One of his notable publications, "English for Foreign Students," caters to audiences who have completed primary education in their regional language but seek to attain English proficiency in their day-to-day activities. This practical focus aligns with the recognition of English as a vital tool for various professional and personal endeavours.

Dr. Kolekar's literary repertoire includes insightful works such as "Secrets from Gopal," where he unveils scientific mysteries. "The World in 2018," his fifth book, serves as a reflection on the events of that year and proposes strategies for addressing contemporary challenges. Additionally, his sixth book, "In-Diadem World," explores political and social issues at the onset of the 21st century. His seventh book is titled “English Effects on India” and his eighth is titled “First Love”. This book is about the profound and universal phenomenon of love, focusing particularly on the challenges and complexities of first love. Drawing from personal experience and scientific insights, the author delves into the intricate dynamics of romantic relationships and the lasting impact of first love on an individual’s life. Through heartfelt reflection and practical advice, the author encourages readers to navigate the rollercoaster of emotions associated through first love with grace and resilience.

With a blend of scientific analysis and compassionate wisdom, the book offers guidance on how to cope with the intensity of first love and emerge stronger and wiser. It serves as a compassionate companion for those grappling with the complexities of love, providing valuable insights and support for navigating the journey of first love with courage and self-awareness. This is his ninth book. Top of Form

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PREFACE

 

According to the eons, the world has been changing.    The last Mahābhārata epic was at the end of the Dvapara Yuga, just before the onset of the Kali Yuga. According to the Puranic scripts, this would place the events of the Mahābhārata around 3102 BCE.   Historical and archaeological attempts to date the Mahābhārata events have resulted in a wide range of estimates, generally spanning from the 12th century BCE to the 8th century BCE. The differences arise from interpretations of astronomical data, linguistic analysis, and other archaeological findings.

 Major themes of the Mahābhārata:

1. Dharma (Duty): A central theme is the concept of dharma, or duty, and its complexities in various situations.
2. Politics and Power: The epic explores themes of leadership, governance, and the use and abuse of power.
3. Family and Conflict: It delves into familial relationships, loyalty, betrayal, and the consequences of actions.

In the 21st Century Mahābhārata also there are similar problems which were experienced in the past. The author has thereby tried to resolve these problems of the community through his eight books. He is of the opinion that his eight published books may contain eight chapters, which means one book for each chapter.  The 21st Century Mahābhārata has nine chapters. 

The ninth chapter of the 21st Century Mahābhārata is in this book.  This is related to current political issues, war, terrorism, social issues and human rights at an international level.  In this case, the author has suggested - “Why should we not bring Global Administration on Earth and resolve the present problems of the human beings and retain only scientific research in the public interest of the world?” 

 

Gopal Rayappa Kolekar

Bangalore

Date: 21st November 2024

 

CONTENTS

1. Russia-Ukraine war - total casualties
2. Role of the United Nations in the Russia-Ukraine War
3. Role of NATO in the Russia-Ukraine War
4. US involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war
5. Iran-Israel war (Hamas and other countries - involvement)
6. Role of the UN in the Iran-Israel war
7. Ongoing tensions between Israel-Lebanon
8. Total casualties in the Iran-Israel war
9. China's conflict with Taiwan and the USA
10. China's conflict with India - total casualties
11. North Korea's conflict with South Korea and Japan
12. Indo-Pak terrorism in J & K - total casualties
13. Race of weapons and its effects on the earth
14. Chances of World War III
15. Human Rights abuses at an international level
16. Wars/conflicts/terrorism in the world - its effects on people
17. Donald Trump’s shooting at rally
18. Bangladesh crisis 
19. 21st Century’s Mahābhārata

 

Conclusion

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Russia-Ukraine war - total casualties

The inclusive number of estimated deaths in the war at Donbas from 6 April 2014 to 31 December 2021 was between 14,200–14,400. This included about 6,500 pro-Russian separatist fighters, 4,400 Ukrainian fighters, and 3,404 civilians. This number comprises non-combat military deaths, as well as deaths from mines and unexploded ordnance. Most of the casualties took place in the first year of the war, when major battle took place before the Minsk agreements.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) confirmed a total of 35,160 civilian casualties during Russia's invasion of Ukraine as of July 31, 2024. Of them, 23,640 people were stated to have been injured. However, OHCHR specified that the real numbers could be higher.

The total number of Ukrainian and Russian troops killed or wounded since the war in Ukraine began about one and a half years ago is nearing 500,000 - a staggering toll as Russia assaults its neighbour and tries to seize more territory.

Russia’s military casualties, are approaching 300,000. This includes as many as 120,000 deaths and 170,000 to 180,000 injured soldiers. The Russian figures dwarf the Ukrainian figures, which the officials put at close to 70,000 killed and 100,000 to 120,000 wounded.

According to Reuters, a declassified U.S. intelligence report assessed that the Ukraine war has cost Russia 315,000 dead and injured troops, or 90% of the people it had when the conflict began.

Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukrainian President said that Ukraine lost 31,000 soldiers during Russia's full-scale invasion since 2022. He refused to give the number of wounded as that would help Russia’s military planning.

Naturally, Ukrainian officials do not make casualty figures public, and other estimates are much higher. It comes after the defence minister said half of all Western aid for Ukraine was delayed, costing lives and irreversible damage. Mr Zelensky said that he was providing an updated death toll in response to the exaggerated figures that Russia has quoted.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, following a lengthy meeting with his top military commanders, said that the condition on the front line of the war was “very, very difficult.” Zelenksy said Ukraine’s forces needed to act swiftly and conclusively to achieve their aims.

Russia said its forces captured the village of Nelipivka on the eastern front line. It had a population of just under a thousand people before the conflict began in 2022, according to official figures. Ukraine’s General Staff made no acknowledgement of the village changing hands but said that Russian forces had launched ten attacks in and around it.

Russia launched several waves of drones aiming Kyiv. Ukraine’s military said the drones were either destroyed or neutralised by electronic warfare during the attack. No casualties or damage were reported.

Russia would increase defence spending by 25 per cent to 13.5 trillion roubles ($145bn) in 2025. The move brings the defence budget to 6.3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), the maximum since the Cold War, according to draft budget documents.

Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 52-year-old former bodyguard Alexei Dyumin to the Security Council, along with a new generation of officials tasked with the working of wartime command centres and overseeing the defence industry.

In a video message to mark two years since Russia’s claimed takeover of four Ukrainian regions, Putin insisted that Moscow would carry out all the goals it had set for itself in Ukraine.

Three journalists for independent Russian media outlets Republic and SOTAvision were arrested in Moscow outside a concert celebrating the annexations. The three had their phones confiscated and charged with “hooliganism,”.

Stephen Hubbard, a 72-year-old US citizen, pleaded guilty in a Moscow court to charges of serving as a mercenary against Russia in the Ukraine war. Hubbard’s sister cast doubt on his reported confession, telling the Reuters news agency he was too old to fight.

A Russian court jailed Alexander Permyakov for life over a 2023 car bombing in the Nizhny Novgorod region that seriously injured writer Zakhar Prilepin and killed his driver. News reports said Permyakov was from Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, once fought with the Russian-backed separatists there and was a passionate supporter of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Ukraine detained a 24-year-old woman and her 40-year-old neighbour in the western city of Ivano-Frankivsk on doubt of being paid by Russia to set military vehicles on fire. Ukraine’s National Police later told the AFP news agency it had recorded “more than 200” similar crimes in several regions this year.

Former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte is set to take over as NATO secretary-general replacing Jens Stoltenberg who has guided the Western alliance during a stormy decade that included Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, urged global leaders to stand with his country and not seek “an out” instead of a “real, just peace" more than two years into Russia's full-scale attack of Ukraine.

At a time when he faces growing pressure from Western allies and some of his fellow Ukrainians to negotiate a ceasefire, Zelenskyy told the UN General Assembly there is no alternative to the “peace formula” he presented two years ago. Among other things, his proposal includes the expulsion of all Russian forces from Ukraine and accountability for war crimes.

“Any parallel or alternative attempts to seek peace are, in fact, efforts to achieve an out instead of an end to the war,” he told assembled leaders and delegates. “Do not divide the world," he implored. "Be united nations, and that will bring us peace.”

Russia has not yet had its turn to speak at the assembly's annual gathering of presidents, prime ministers, monarchs, and other high officials. Low-level Russian diplomats occupied the country's seats in the huge assembly hall during Zelenskyy's speech.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, who faces an International Criminal Court arrest warrant over his military's actions in Ukraine, is not attending this year's high-level meetings at the General Assembly.

Speaking at the UN Security Council, Zelenskyy argued that Russia needs to “be forced into peace”, saying there is no point in chasing peace talks with Putin.

In Moscow, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded that the Ukrainian president’s call for compulsion was “a fatal mistake” and “a profound misconception, which, of course, will inevitably have consequences for the Kyiv regime.”

The war in Ukraine was a central topic at the last two annual General Assemblies, but this year, the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza and the mounting developments along the Israeli Lebanese border have taken much of the limelight.

Two-and-a-half years after the full-scale invasion was launched, Ukraine and Russia are locked in a relentless fight along a 1,000-kilometre front line.

Russia appears to have gained some momentum in Ukraine’s east. Ukraine, meanwhile, startled Russia by sending troops across the border in an incursion. During the first two weeks of September, Russia launched over 640 Shahed drones on Ukrainian cities, according to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

In the intervening time, Moscow will not run out of them any time soon as microchips, semiconductors and other microelectronics from China, the US and the EU are still being found in Russian drones and missiles launched at Ukraine.

Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Zelenskyy's advisor and commissioner for sanctions policy, said Moscow has still been able to replenish its war machine, although the sanctions did affect it.

"Russians are still quite able to acquire those parts and produce the weapons, including missiles and drones. We also are quite happy that the Russians are receiving less parts than they want, and they are paying much higher price than they wanted to," Vlasiuk told Euronews.

The EU sanctions envoy, David O'Sullivan, has more details and numbers: "We estimate that in some cases for microelectronics it is now 125% more expensive than it was, in some cases 300% more expensive. So, this all together constitutes a substantial damage to the Russian military industrial complex."

He says one of the crucial steps in making it possible is finding the list of the priority battlefield products, done by the Kyiv scientific research institute of forensic ability.

Ukraine is set to receive close to €4.2 billion in funds after the Council greenlit - on 6 August 2024 - the first regular payment of grants and loans under the EU's Ukraine Facility, to support Ukraine's macro-financial stability and the functioning of its public administration.

The Council concluded that Ukraine had fulfilled the necessary reform indicators and satisfied the conditions envisioned in Ukraine Plan for receiving the funds. The reforms cover public economic management, governance of state-owned enterprises, the business environment, energy, and demining.

The EU and its member states strongly condemn Russia's brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. They also condemn Belarus' involvement in Russia's military aggression.

Since February 2022, the European Council and the Council of the European Union have been meeting regularly to discuss the situation in Ukraine from various viewpoints.

EU leaders demanded repeatedly that Russia at once cease its military actions, unreservedly withdraw all forces and military equipment from Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. They emphasised the right of Ukraine to choose its own destiny and praised the people of Ukraine for their courage in defending their country.

In response to the military aggression, the EU has enormously expanded sanctions against Russia, by adding a substantial number of persons and entities to the sanctions list, and by adopting extraordinary restrictive measures.

The EU has shown unity and strength and has provided Ukraine with humanitarian, political, monetary, and military support. The EU is committed to continue to show solidarity and provide support to the refugees fleeing the war in Ukraine and the countries hosting them. It is also coordinating with associates and allies, within the UN, OSCE, NATO and the G7.

In several instances, the European Council condemned Russia’s indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and urged Russia to stop the regular missile strikes against Ukraine's energy structure.

EU leaders underlined that Russia, Belarus and all those responsible for war crimes and the other most serious crimes will be held to account for their actions following international law.

The EU has approved several sanctions in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

The measures are designed to weaken Russia's economic base, depriving it of critical technologies and markets and pointedly limiting its ability to wage war.

The EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus, Iran, and North Korea in response to their participation in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

NATO members should not be deterred from giving more military aid to Ukraine by Vladimir Putin's "reckless Russian nuclear rhetoric", outgoing NATO boss Jens Stoltenberg told Reuters in an interview.

Stoltenberg was reacting to a declaration from Putin last week that Russia could use nuclear weapons if it were struck with conventional missiles, and that Moscow would consider any assault on it supported by a nuclear power to be a joint attack.

Putin's warning came as the United States and its allies deliberate over whether to let Ukraine fire conventional Western missiles deep into Russia. Kyiv says it wants permission to hit targets that are part of Russia's war effort.

"What we have seen is a pattern of irresponsible Russian nuclear rhetoric and messaging, and this fits into that pattern," Stoltenberg, who hands over the NATO leadership to Dutch ex-prime minister Mark Rutte on Tuesday after a decade in charge.

"Every time we have stepped up our support with new types of weapons - battle tanks, long-range fires or F-16s - the Russians have tried to prevent us," Stoltenberg told Reuters at NATO headquarters. "They have not succeeded and also this latest example should not prevent NATO allies from supporting Ukraine."

He said NATO had not detected any change in Russia's nuclear posture "that requires any changes from our side".

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Role of the United Nations in the
   Russia–Ukraine War

 

With the war between Russia and Ukraine still raging as of November 2024, when this chapter is being finalized, the findings described in the previous sections are quite concerning with regard to the inability of the UN to prevent such a major and primarily foreseen fight, as well as the failure of its Security Council to deal with an armed conflict that involves one of its five permanent members as an attacker.

While strong political responses by the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council have partly compensated for this, the UN Secretary-General, the top-most official associated with global peacemaking, has proved unwilling or unable to engage in peacemaking beyond statements of principle and humanitarian action.

All this portends poorly for the UN and, more importantly, for a world with increasing geopolitical conflicts among significant powers that undermine efforts to achieve global goals for peace and justifiable development.

Addressing the Security Council, Ukraine President Zelenskyy challenged the Council to either remove Russia from its membership to prevent it from stalling decisions on its aggression or dissolve itself if it could do nothing but talk (UN News, 2024b). As passionately charged this may have been, and coming as it did from the leader of a state under attack by one of the veto-yielding P5 Security Council members, one should not declare the UN’s death hastily.

The history of the UN’s creation shows that “the Security Council is functioning exactly how it was supposed to work.” If the veto right had not been given to the big powers, Stalin would not have agreed to have the Soviet Union join the UN, nor would the US Senate have approved the UN Charter in 1945 (Weiss, 2022).

In fact, the veto has been used over the years by all of the P5 to protect their vital interests at critical moments (United Nations, 2022k).

This does not mean that the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s use of the veto to ensure no decision can be reached by the Security Council against it does not cast into doubt the legality of the UN and its Security Council. It certainly adds fuel to the argument about the UN 2.0 that Secretary-General António Guterres has ignited through his Our Common Agenda report of September 2021 (United Nations, 2021).

UN Charter Article 109, which provides for a long-overdue Charter review conference, is increasingly cited as the way forward. A decision to that end could be made at the Summit of the Future proposed by the UN Secretary-General in Our Common Agenda and now scheduled to take place in end 2024 (Lopez-Claros & Perell, 2022).

In the interim, the UN General Assembly resolution demanding that, when a P5 uses their veto privilege, they have to appear before the Assembly to explain themselves is a modest but symbolically important step towards greater responsibility and restraint (Government of Liechtenstein, 2022; UN News, 2022c).

Overall, the UN system responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine from the very beginning, making up for its helplessness to get a resolution past the Russian veto on the Security Council with an Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly and resolutions passed comfortably there, even if with no binding power.

The Human Rights Council and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry that it created found indication of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Reactions against Russia in other UN system organisations such as ICAO, the statements of the UN Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteurs, and others, have all stood up to Russian bitterness with conviction and determination and mobilised significant humanitarian aid to help Ukrainians in their country and as refugees abroad.

The UN failed in conflict stoppage notwithstanding the intensifying signs during the days and weeks before the Russian attack on Ukraine. The biggest test for its survival, though, lies with the part that the UN will play, if any, in ending the violence, setting up a process for the peaceable resolution of the conflict, and avoiding deliberate or inadvertent nuclear war.

The grain, fertiliser, and Zaporizhzhya deals are worth praise. Still, UN diplomacy and the Secretary-General's good offices seem to be positioned with extreme caution, or not at all, about the core of the fight itself. The fact that the world’s most significant powers face off here may explain this attitude. However, suppose the UN wants to still be relevant and valuable after this “World War III” type situation. In that case, it will have to show that it has a vision, is ready to mobilise for an inclusive future and can proactively stand for humanity's joint good. The jury is still out on that.

The security situation in Ukraine worsened rapidly following the launch of a Russian Federation military offensive on 24 February 2023. The armed violence escalated in at least eight regions, including Kyivska region and the capital city of Kyiv, as well as in the eastern regions Donetsk and Luhansk which were already affected by conflict.

The escalation of conflict has activated an immediate and steep rise in humanitarian needs as essential supplies and services are disrupted, and civilians run away from the fighting. The UN estimates that 12 million people inside Ukraine will need relief and protection, while more than four million Ukrainian evacuees may need protection and help in neighbouring countries in the coming months.

On 1 March 2024, the UN and humanitarian partners launched coordinated Flash Appeals for a combined $1.7 billion to urgently deliver humanitarian support to people in Ukraine and refugees in neighbouring countries.

Within Ukraine, the plan requires $1.1 billion to meet the mounting humanitarian needs of more than six million people affected and displaced by military operations. Outside the country, the UN requested $551 million to help Ukrainians who have fled across borders, mainly to Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova.

Amin Awad, the UN Crisis Coordinator for Ukraine called for an "immediate humanitarian pause", on 5 March, in the fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces, as UN aid materials continue to arrive in the country.

The message of the General Assembly is loud and clear:  End hostilities in Ukraine — now. Silence the guns — now. Open the door to dialogue and diplomacy — now.

We do not have a moment to lose. The vicious effects of the conflict are plain to see. But as bad as the situation is for the people in Ukraine right now, it threatens to get much worse. The ticking clock is a time bomb.

The world wants an end to the great human suffering in Ukraine. This same reality was clear in the speedy mobilisation of funds for our lifesaving humanitarian operations in Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Our global flash appeal was met with record big-heartedness.

Looking forward, I will continue to do everything in my power to contribute to an immediate cessation of hostilities and urgent talks for peace. People in Ukraine desperately need peace. And people around the world demand it.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has passed the one-year mark, and the crisis shows no signs of letting up. The war in Ukraine has forced millions of people to flee their homes ⁠— sometimes with little more than the clothes they are wearing. Others stay trapped in beleaguered areas without access to food, water, or essential services.

The UN has been stepping up to deliver lifesaving aid to those in need by providing emergency food, water, shelter, and medical care to the most helpless, including women, children, and the aged.

 

Amid the ongoing destruction, humanitarian needs continue to rise — but resources are falling short. The UN has more than 1,400 personnel on the ground across all 24 regions in Ukraine.

The World Health Organisation has opened an operations hub in Rzeszów, Poland, positioning emergency medical teams and supplies across the border. The agency has also developed a pipeline of trauma kits to most Ukrainian cities, each of which holds enough surgical apparatus and antiseptics to save the lives of 150 wounded people.

The World Food Programme is providing emergency food aid to families affected by the fight in Ukraine, including cash, vouchers, ready-to-eat foods, and freshly baked bread.

In response to the fastest-growing refugee crisis in Europe since World War II, UNHCR is delivering fundamental relief items — such as emergency shelters, thermal blankets, and sleeping mats — as well as providing specialist protection services for children traveling alone and people with debilities.

Fighting in Ukraine has destroyed hospitals and dislocated access to healthcare, putting girls and women at grave risk. UNFPA is deploying trained personnel, mobile clinics, hygiene supplies, and emergency reproductive health kits to protect the lives of mothers and their babies. The agency is also providing specialised spaces and services for survivors of gender-based violence.

OCHA is coordinating the humanitarian response across the entire UN system to scale up services as quickly and efficiently as possible. UNESCO is helping journalists cover the conflict in Ukraine by providing protective gear and training on hostile environments. The agency is also mapping how host countries can support education needs for Ukraine’s youngest evacuees.

More than half of Ukraine’s children have been exiled by the conflict. UNICEF is supporting health, nutrition, HIV prevention, education, access to safe drinking water, sanitation and protection for children and families affected by the violence.

IAEA is monitoring the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear power reactors and providing technical assistance. Russia’s unprovoked and unreasonable war against Ukraine has started a crisis unmatched in scale and impact on the European territory since WWII. As the United Nations (UN) Secretary General António Guterres confirmed during a recent trip to Moscow, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a violation of its territorial integrity and of the Charter of the United Nations.”

The war has already caused great damage and devastation, the loss of thousands of lives, and the massive destruction of the country’s economy and structure. Some analysts and political experts even fear that the war could have a spillover effect, swamping the European continent in a disaster with overwhelming consequences.

As a result of just two months of fighting, constant artillery barrage, rocket assaults, and violent attacks against civilians, close to five million people have been forced to leave their homes and seek shelter somewhere else. Many third-country nationals also found themselves aground amid the Russian invasion, complicating the situation further.

While many Ukrainians fled to safer parts of their motherland, many of them ended up moving to foreign countries. According to official sources, Poland has accepted more than three million Ukrainian refugees. In most cases, these people fled with little or no possessions. Unfortunately, elderly citizens or others unable to move have stayed behind and faced constant bombings, with limited access to food, water, and basic infrastructure. As the war continues, it will bring further economic hardship that could have a calamitous effect for years to come.

Many Western nations have rushed to extend their support to Ukraine in a prompt manner, providing humanitarian, as well as military support on the ground and outside of the country. However, states alone cannot achieve effective solutions to these challenges unless there are concerted efforts in the form of international organisations. Future fears make it clearer that it will be vital to act together, forming partnerships and firming up existing ones.

Several international organisations jumped to answer to the needs of the victims of the war. Many of them in countries neighbouring Ukraine, mostly in Poland due to safety and security issues. Bearing in mind the size of the country and the size of the crisis, more needs to be done in the immediate future and the long-term view.

During these unusually challenging times, the role of international organisations in dealing with such crises is made copiously clear. The war provides grounds for talks on reforming major international organisations, such as the UN. The mere fact that the invader country is a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, with the power to block actions in favour of Ukraine, is disturbing. According to the UN Secretary General, “The Security Council did not do everything in its power to prevent this war. This is a source of great disappointment, frustration, and anger.”

The UN, as the biggest gathering of sovereign states, should have a leading role in preventing wars and fights, and in handling the humanitarian disasters that occur as a result. The UN did appoint the Crisis Coordinator for Ukraine, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court did open an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity, several resolutions and declarations were issued, however, more urgent action and solutions are needed. Time is of the essence when the situation in Ukraine worsens on an hourly basis.

The part of the European Union in both political and economic help during the crisis is vital. The EU and its member states are the UN’s largest financial allies. Despite the less than stellar reaction of several EU member states, the answer of the EU as a whole and its governing body to the current advances in Ukraine is to be welcomed. The sanctions levied on Russia by the European Union and its member states, the temporary trade liberalisation with Ukraine, military support, financial aid and other actions that will support Ukraine during and after the war are of extreme importance. It is essential for the EU to keep the current course and to further increase aid in its neighbourhood in various directions, mainly during times of such unparalleled crisis.

 

 

 

1. Role of NATO in the
   Russia-Ukraine War
   
   

NATO condemned in the strongest possible terms Russia's brutal and senseless war of aggression against Ukraine - which is an independent, peaceful and democratic country, and a close NATO partner. NATO and Allies continue to provide Ukraine with unique levels of support, helping to uphold its fundamental right to self-defense.

Countries like, USA, Germany, Hungary and Sweden are in constant touch with Ukrainian President Zelensky. They are offering military aid to Ukraine and forming various war approaches to end this war as soon as possible.

Ukraine has repeatedly stated its intention to become a NATO member. Ukraine applied for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2008. However, this plan was scrapped in 2010 after pro-Russian leader Viktor Yanukovych was elected as President. He stated that he preferred to keep the country non-aligned.

Russia's illegal war of antagonism against Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe. NATO's Strategic Concept states that Russia is the most important and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Russia wants to set up spheres of influence and control other countries through pressure, subversion, aggression, and takeover. It uses conservative, cyber and hybrid means – including disinformation – against NATO Allies and partners.

NATO does not seek conflict and poses no threat to Russia. The Alliance will continue to respond to Russian threats and actions in a united and accountable way. We are significantly strengthening our deterrence and defense, supporting our partners, and enhancing our flexibility. This includes calling out Russia's actions and contradicting disinformation.

NATO is not at war with Russia. We do not seek confrontation with Russia. NATO supports Ukraine in its right to self-defense, as protected in the UN Charter. In response to Russia's aggressive actions, we continue to strengthen our dissuasion and defense to make sure there is no room for misunderstanding that NATO is ready to protect and defend every Ally.

NATO is a defensive Alliance. Our core task is to keep our nations safe. At the Vilnius Summit, Allies reiterated their iron-clad commitment to always defend every inch of Allied territory. We will continue to protect our one billion people, and defend freedom and democracy, following Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

The war in Ukraine has no precedent in the Cold War era. NATO is facing a riskier situation than anything it had to deal with then. The Soviet Union and the United States waged proxy wars then in distant places—in Vietnam, Angola, and Congo. Those wars did not pose a threat to either superpower’s heartland. Nor would either superpower tolerate such threats.

In 1962, the United States went to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union when Soviet missile sites were discovered in Cuba, 90 miles from Key West. The Soviets wanted to deploy their missiles to Cuba to counter U.S. missiles positioned in Türkiye near the Soviet border.

Sixty years later, NATO is financing and arming Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression, and Ukraine is launching strikes into the Russian heartland every day. The point is not whether Ukraine has the right to defend itself and hit back against Russian brutality. It has. Putin’s criminal mistake is why Ukrainian drones are striking Russian refineries. The point is that these are vastly different risks than what the allies dealt with during the Cold War.

The trial before the allies at this summit is bigger than anything they have faced since the Cold War. It is not to keep Ukraine in the fight for the long run but to find a way to end this war without surrendering Ukraine in the process.

The war is at “a really critical moment,” said the event’s moderator, David E. Sanger ’82, the White House and national security correspondent for The New York Times. Ukraine suffered damage over the last several months as it waited for Congress to approve a $60.8 billion aid package in late April. The Russians have re-claimed territory in Eastern Ukraine, he continued, and while they have endured significant casualties, their fighting force stays large and strong and has gotten better at using drones and other forms of electronic warfare.

“This is not a war about territory, it’s a war about the future of Ukraine,” said Ivo Daalder, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO and now president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “The way to defeat Russia is for Russia to be denied the opportunity to determine Ukraine’s future.”

Many European Union countries continue to provide support to Ukraine, and some, like Lithuania, are considering sending their own troops to fight. Whether other NATO allies and the U.S. ought to do the same, given the stakes, will be a topic of serious debate at the upcoming summit in Washington, D.C.

Still, the U.S. stays a “hugely important actor” in the direction this conflict will take in the coming months, according to Karen Donfried, former assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs in the Biden administration and a Belfer Center fellow. The EU cannot replace the role that the U.S. is playing in Ukraine, she said. “Were it not for the weapons we’re providing Ukraine, they would not still be in this fight.”

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is a military alliance set up on 4 April 1949. NATO, which was initially set up with 12-member countries, has expanded by increasing the number of members over time and has enlarged its membership to 31 by 2023.

The main purpose of NATO is to help the attacked country in case of an attack between member countries, to keep international peace and security, to prevent crisis situations by co-operating between member countries. In addition, it aims to help member states develop their military abilities through co-operation in areas such as military training, exercises, and technological co-operation, to protect democratic norms and values among member states. In line with these aims, NATO intends to improve international security through military, political and economic co-operation.

On 24 February 2022, with Russia’s attack on Ukraine, NATO’s attitude attracted attention. Since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, these actions of Russia do not pave the way for the operation of Article 5.

The security of Ukraine is of great importance to NATO and its member states. The Alliance fully supports Ukraine’s intrinsic right to self-defence, and its right to choose its own security arrangements. Ukraine’s future is in NATO. Relations between NATO and Ukraine date back to the early 1990s and have since developed into one of the most significant of NATO’s partnerships. Since 2014, in the wake of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, cooperation has been intensified in critical areas. As Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, NATO and Allies have provided extraordinary levels of support.

NATO condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which gravely weakens Euro-Atlantic and global security and stability and is a deliberate violation of international law. NATO Allies, in concert with relevant steadfastness of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, demand that Russia stop the war at once, cease its use of force against Ukraine, and unconditionally withdraw all its forces from Ukraine.

Furthermore, NATO Allies call on Russia to fully respect international humanitarian law, and to allow safe and unrestricted humanitarian access and aid to all persons in need. There can be no exemption for Russian war crimes and other atrocities, such as attacks against civilians and the destruction of civilian set-up, which deprives millions of Ukrainians of basic human amenities. All those responsible must be held answerable for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, particularly against Ukraine’s civilian population, including the forced banishment of children and conflict-related sexual violence.

Russia’s war has also had a profound impact on the environment, nuclear safety, energy and food security, the global economy, and the welfare of billions of people around the world. Allies and Ukraine strongly condemn Russia’s decision to withdraw from the Black Sea grain deal and its deliberate attempts to stop Ukraine’s agricultural exports, on which hundreds of millions of people worldwide depend. Allies are working to revitalise the grain deal and to enable the continual exports of Ukrainian grain by land and sea, including in cooperation with the European Union and the United Nations.

Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the beginning of its aggression in eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has adopted a firm position in full support of Ukraine's sovereignty and provincial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial waters.

NATO Allies have equally condemned Russia's continued aggression and destabilising activities in eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea region since 2014. NATO has increased its presence in the Black Sea and stepped-up maritime cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia.

NATO also condemns Russia's illegal attempt to annex four regions of Ukraine – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia – in September 2023, which is the largest attempted land grab in Europe since the Second World War. The mock referenda in these regions were engineered in Moscow and imposed on Ukraine. They have no legitimacy, and NATO will not recognise them. These lands are Ukraine and will always be Ukraine. The crushing vote in the United Nations General Assembly condemning Russia's attempted annexations sent a clear and strong message that Russia is isolated, and that the world stands with Ukraine, in defence of the rules-based international order.

As a result of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, NATO Allies decided in 2014 to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, while leaving political and military channels of communication open. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Allies have imposed severe sanctions on Russia to help starve the Kremlin's war machine of resources. Allies continue to refine these sanctions to increase the pressure on Moscow. These efforts will make it stiffer for Russia to rebuild its tanks, manufacture missiles and finance its war.

Since 2014, regular consultations have taken place in the NATO-Ukraine Commission in view of the direct threats faced by Ukraine to its territorial integrity, political independence, and security. The Commission met for extraordinary meetings following Russia’s aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, after Russia's baseless use of military force against Ukrainian ships near the Kerch Strait in November 2018 and during Russia's threatening military build-up in April 2021. Other extraordinary meetings of the Commission took place at NATO Headquarters in January and February 2022, focused on Russia's military build-up and uncalled-for invasion of Ukraine. Throughout the war, NATO and Ukraine continued to consult on the security situation and Allied support to Ukraine through the Commission. In July 2023, at the Vilnius Summit, the Commission was upgraded into the NATO-Ukraine Council, showing the consolidation of political ties and Ukraine’s increasing incorporation with NATO. Furthermore, recognising Ukraine’s increased interoperability and substantial progress with reforms, Allies decided at the 2023 Vilnius Summit that Ukraine’s path to full Euro-Atlantic combination has moved beyond the need for the Membership Action Plan – changing Ukraine’s path to NATO from a two-step process to a one-step process.

NATO stands in steadfast solidarity with the government and people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their nation, their land, and our shared values. The Alliance fully supports Ukraine’s intrinsic right to self-defence as cherished in Article 51 of the UN Charter. NATO Allies stay steadfast in their commitment to further stepping up political and practical support to Ukraine as it continues to defend its independence, sovereignty, and territorial veracity within its internationally recognised borders.

In parallel to its political support, NATO has expressively stepped up its practical assistance to Ukraine. Immediately following the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed on measures to augment Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security. They also decided to further develop their practical support to Ukraine, based on a significant improvement of existing cooperation programmes as well as the development of substantial new programmes.

At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Alliance's measures in support of Ukraine became part of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), which is designed to support Ukraine's aptitude to provide for its own security and to implement wide-ranging reforms based on NATO standards, Euro-Atlantic principles, and best practices.

Under the CAP, NATO has helped Ukraine transform its security and defence sector for many years, giving strategic-level advice via the NATO Representation to Ukraine as well as NATO Headquarters, and practical support through a range of capacity-building programmes and inventiveness. Through these programmes and tailored advice, NATO has pointedly strengthened the ability and resilience of Ukraine's security and defence sector, as well as its ability to counter hybrid threats. NATO and Allies have also provided wide-ranging support to capability development, including through training and education and the provision of equipment.

As part of the CAP, several Trust Funds were launched since 2014, providing resources to support capability development and maintainable capacity-building in key areas. In 2021, NATO consolidated and transitioned all pre-existing Trust Funds supporting Ukraine into a single Ukraine CAP Trust Fund. The Ukraine CAP Trust Fund enables resourcing for Ukraine-related activities within a single dedicated instrument, a flexible and scalable fund to provide Ukraine with short-term non-lethal military assistance as well as long-term capacity-building support.

Completed projects have also supported Ukraine in the areas of military career transition; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED); the destruction of small arms and light weapons (SALW), conventional ammunition, and anti-personnel landmines; ammunition stockpile safety management; safe radioactive waste disposal and land restoration; cyber defence; and logistics and standardisation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. US involvement in the
   Russia-Ukraine war
   
   

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale assault of Ukraine, a country Russia first invaded in 2014 and has partially occupied for a decade. The war has led to hundreds of thousands of killed or wounded, according to U.S. and other estimates, and the dislocation of more than nine million people as of May 2024, according to international humanitarian organizations. In 2024, Russia has steered multiple offensives, seizing some added Ukrainian towns and settlements. Ukraine continues to wage defensive operations, strengthened by military aid from the United States and Europe.

To date, US has provided more than $61.3 billion in military aid since Russia launched its unprovoked, and brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and approximately $64.1 billion in military aid since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014.  We have now used the emergency Presidential Drawdown Authority on 53 occasions since August 2021 to provide Ukraine military aid totaling approximately $31.2 billion from DoD stockpiles.

On September 26, 2024, the Department let Congress know of the intent to direct the drawdown of up to approximately $5.55 billion in defense services from DoD stocks for military aid to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown Authority. This drawdown will use the remaining authority of the Presidential Drawdown Authority under section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance for fiscal year 2024 provided by Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024 (Div. B, P.L. 118-50) (USSAA), which expires on September 30, 2024. As a result of this planned drawdown, the United States will be able to continue to provide defense articles and services to Ukraine from DoD stocks under Presidential Drawdown Authority on a continual basis and stays available for Ukraine regardless of the end of the fiscal year.

To date, US Congress has appropriated $4.65 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) across two supplemental packages for Ukraine and “countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.” Of this total, $4 billion has been notified to Congress. The first Ukraine supplemental also provided $4 billion in FMF loan authority and $4 billion in loan guarantees to NATO Allies.

Pew Research Centre found about a third of Americans (31%) say the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine. Equal shares of U.S. adults say the U.S. is providing about the right amount (25%) or not enough support (24%) to Ukraine, while 18% say they are not sure.

Half of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine, compared with 16% of Democrats and Democratic leaners.

In March 2022, almost half of Republicans said the U.S. was not providing enough support to Ukraine, 11 points more than the share of Democrats who said this. Today, that same share of Republicans (49%) say that the U.S. is providing too much aid to Ukraine.

There are wide partisan gaps on this topic. Many Democrats (55%) are extremely or overly concerned about the possibility of Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia, up 10 points since September 2022. About a third of Republicans (35%) hold this view, little changed from 32% in fall of 2022.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has produced an outpouring of international support for Kyiv. The United States has led these efforts. Even before Russian forces rushed across the border, the United States and many of its allies signaled their opposition to Moscow’s destructive ambitions by warning of a range of potential sanctions Russia would incur, working to mobilize a potential diplomatic coalition against Moscow, and bolstering Ukraine’s military forces.

Since the invasion, the United States has taken the lead in providing Ukraine with military equipment and training, economic aid, a near-blank cheque of diplomatic support, intelligence of use for stymying Russia’s offensive, and threatening draconian significances should Russia use nuclear weapons in its campaign. Increasingly fervent bipartisan calls to penalize Russia, Ukraine’s lobbying efforts for added aid, mounting calls from many think-tankers and pundits to do more on Kyiv’s behalf, and the Biden administration’s gradual increase in support for Kyiv since February all suggest the American pledge may only grow in the future.

Nevertheless, the Biden administration and other advocates of current U.S. policy have so far failed to offer a strategic argument on behalf of the costs and risks that current U.S. policy incurs in the Russia-Ukraine War. To be sure, many have defined specific aims vis-à-vis Ukraine itself.

Still, definition and discussion of how U.S. efforts in Ukraine contribute to overarching U.S. national aims and interests are broadly lacking, reduced primarily to gestures toward broad principles that might justify the American response in Ukraine so far. Amid the continuing war and ongoing calls for the United States to “do more,” the question stays: what, if any, are the United States’ premeditated interests in Ukraine—and how might the United States best service them?

Although often lost amid the rush of events, policymakers and pundits have been quick to imply an abiding American interest in Ukraine. Without fully explaining on the argument or issues at hand, these claims broadly fall into two camps.

One line holds that the United States cannot tolerate Russian aggression in Ukraine because it will only encourage further aggrandisement and expanding threats to the United States. This claim comes in two forms. The narrow version holds that the danger of future aggression is from Russia specifically—that is, if Russia goes unchallenged in Ukraine, then Moscow will simply expand its ambitions, challenge the United States’ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, and threaten European security. Along these lines, former ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul argues that “we have a security interest in [helping Ukraine defeat Russia]. Let us just put it very simply: if Putin wins in Donbas and is encouraged to go further into Ukraine, that will be threatening to our NATO allies.” Similarly, former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley asserts that the United States has an abiding concern in deterring Russian president Vladimir Putin “from thinking he can in the next five or ten years repeat this performance.” This particular concern helps explain why at least some in the Biden administration call for “weaken[ing] Russia” by bleeding it in Ukraine: as a National Security Council spokesperson put it, “one of our goals has been to limit Russia’s ability to do something like this again” by weakening “Russia’s economic and military power to threaten and attack its neighbours.”

The broad version links Ukraine War not to Russia per se but to potential aggrandisement by others, especially China. President Joe Biden himself advanced a version of this argument, writing in March that, “If Russia does not pay a heavy price for its actions, it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and conquer other countries;” elsewhere, he asserts that “Throughout our history, we’ve learned that when dictators do not pay the price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and engage in more aggression.” Nor is this concern Biden’s alone: suggesting its bipartisan appeal, Representative Michael McCaul of Texas offers that failing to act in Ukraine would “embolden Vladimir Putin and his fellow autocrats by demonstrating the United States will surrender in the face of sabre-rattling,” concluding that “U.S. credibility from Kyiv to Taipei cannot withstand another blow of this nature.”

Distinct from concerns with future aggrandisement, a second set of arguments holds that the United States has an enduring interest in Ukraine because it affects the so-called “liberal international order.” As Secretary of State Antony Blinken asserts, “the international rules-based order that’s critical to maintaining peace and security is being put to the test by Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine.” The logic here looks to be two-fold. First, not backing Ukraine would call into question American support for democracies worldwide, thereby undermining the feasibility of democracy as a way of organising any society’s political life. As Biden explained, Ukraine was part of an ongoing “battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression;” by insinuation, not aiding Ukraine would set the United States back in this contest. Second, Russian aggrandisement is itself a challenge to key principles—mostly unspecified, but notions that powerful states should not use force to impose their will on weaker actors and that violations of state sovereignty should not be tolerated—upon which the liberal order rests. To ignore Russian aggression would call into question the future operation of the U.S.-backed system. As Anne Applebaum argues, the United States must be invested in the conflict since "the realistic, honest understanding of the war is an understanding that we now face a country that is revanchist, that seeks to expand its territory for ideological reasons, that wishes to end the American presence in Europe, that wishes to undermine NATO and has a fundamentally different view of the world from the one that we have."

Put simply, inaction risks authorizing alternate principles upon which international order would rest and which would harm the United States.

However, these claims have gone broadly unremarked. Again, the United States has run real risks—most dramatically, possible military increase and thus a nuclear exchange with Russia—and borne actual costs—including aid equivalent to the budgets of the U.S. Transportation, Labor, and Commerce Departments combined—for the sake of helping Ukraine. Many analysts claim that the escalation risks involved are lower than one might think as, for instance, Russia would not be so suicidal as to risk war with the United States and its allies. Still, billions of dollars stay at stake at a time of rising domestic resource demands, and the fact that policymakers are debating how threatening American responses are likely to be viewed in Moscow recommends the risks being run are not negligible. It may be impolitic, but sound statecraft means we ought to ask whether the game is worth the candle.

The truth is that none of the avowed U.S. interests in Ukraine stand up to scrutiny. As importantly, believing they are U.S. interests contradicts core tenets of long-established U.S. grand strategy; making policy based on such risks creating further strategic dilemmas for the United States, Ukraine, and Russia in ways that may only worsen the consequences of the present conflict.

Worry that failure to act in Ukraine will simply whet Russia’s appetite for European aggression beyond Ukraine—particularly against the United States’ NATO allies—and thus merits an expanding American response is questionable. To be sure, some states at some times are dominated by domestic elites convinced that aggression is cheap and worthwhile. Still, to argue that unopposed Russian behaviour in Ukraine will yield further Russian aggrandisement is to argue that there are no other constraints that can keep Russian ambitions or behavior in check. Common sense, international relations theory, and current trends in European security all write down otherwise.

States faced with a proximate and militarily ambitious actor tend to balance and check its opportunities for further aggression. In an anarchic world, this sort of behaviour reflects the fact that self-interested states must ensure their own security and so are incentivized to offset possible aggressors. We see these trends in Europe today, where Russia’s actions have rapidly spurred both arming (e.g., Germany’s growing defence budget) and allying (e.g., Sweden and Finland joining NATO, discussion of European military autonomy). Furthermore, the distribution of power in Europe—where the European members of NATO alone have a combined gross domestic product twelve times that of Russia—underlines that there are multiple states which, singly or collectively, are more than capable of influencing Russian calculations. Russia, in short, is increasingly hemmed-in and is likely to be further constrained should it contemplate future aggression in Europe.

Even a leader as daring as Putin cannot easily ignore this situation and is likely to factor it into Russian strategic choices. Yet even if he—or a successor—were to overlook these limits, the beauty of balancing is that aggressors yet meet resistance that thwarts their efforts. Put differently, even a wild Russia that somehow concludes aggression after Ukraine is practical is unlikely to get extremely far.

This is doubly true as far as aggression against NATO members is concerned. Distinct from efforts to aid Ukraine itself, the alliance has responded to Russian aggression by drawing together to a degree matchless in the last twenty years; both declared policy and emerging military trends say that its members are progressively committed to defending what Biden termed “every inch of NATO territory.” The conflict has thus made it clear that Russia risks an overwhelming (outside the nuclear realm) counterbalancing coalition should it try to move against NATO members. Combined, and completely separate from anything on the ground in Ukraine, there are thus strong reasons borne of the strategic map to doubt whether any Russian policymaker will conclude further aggression in Europe will pay or succeed in such a course if they do. Ukraine is not conclusive in shaping or thwarting Russian ambitions.

A similar problem applies to claims that not acting in Ukraine will cause other states, particularly China, to conclude that aggression pays. By this logic, the world is full of possible aggressors that are held in check by their fear of an American response; it further implies that aggression anywhere is a threat to U.S. national security. Arguing that the United States must act in Ukraine to anticipate others’ aggression is thus tantamount to arguing that the United States must serve as a global police officer that dare not rest anywhere, even for a moment.

Holding aside that policymakers have long shunned the idea of the United States serving as the world’s police officer, there are several problems with this argument. First, as Stephen Walt notes, the historical record is replete with aggressors paying exorbitant costs for their behaviour—think of Germany’s defeat, occupation, and division following World War II or the firebombing of Japan. Nevertheless, aggression stays a reality in international politics as, even when one aggressor is defeated, others do not readily seem to “learn” the lesson.

Second, allowing that probable aggressors may exist, an array of research shows that state calculations are shaped not by general impressions of how a single great power may respond, but related judgments of whether correcting and punishment are given the distribution of power and known state interests. Extending the point, the United States (1) can afford to ignore Ukraine without risking aggression in other areas provided it has an interest in and the means for checking other potential threats, or (2) there are local actors able and interested in the same. This makes instinctive sense: Beijing, for instance, is likely to care far more about what the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Australia, etc., can and will do in Asia than it cares about what the United States does 4,000 miles away. Analysts that treat Ukraine as decisive to other states’ aggression overlook the geopolitical constraints that are likely to shape others’ interest in and openings for aggrandisement.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Iran-Israel war
   (Hamas & other countries - involvement)
   
   

The outlines of an answer to this were already clear on April 19, 2022 when, for the first time in its history, Iran directly attacked Israel by firing more than three hundred missiles and drones. This came in response to an April 1 Israeli attack on its consular building in Damascus, that was considered inviolable given its diplomatic standing. It also housed high-ranking officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force that was involved in coordinating the Resistance Axis in the area. In those attacks, Iran was joined by associated Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iraqi Shia militias, while also receiving some support from the Syrian army.

On the other side, Israel’s defense was assisted not just by its Western allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—but by its Arab neighbor Jordan, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) sharing intelligence about the attacks. In short, Iran needed to depend on mostly its non-state actors, while some major states in the Middle East helped Israel.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates to the end of the nineteenth century. In 1947, the United Nations adopted Resolution 181, known as the Partition Plan, which sought to divide the British Mandate of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was created, sparking the first Arab Israeli War. The war ended in 1949 with Israel’s victory, but 750,000 Palestinians were displaced, and the territory was divided into three parts: The State of Israel, the West Bank (of the Jordan River), and the Gaza Strip.

In early October 2023, Hamas fighters fired rockets into Israel and stormed southern Israeli cities and towns across the border of the Gaza Strip in a surprise attack, killing more than 1,300 Israelis, injuring 3,300 and taking hundreds of hostages.

A day after the October 7 attack, the Israeli cabinet formally stated war against Hamas, followed by a directive from the defense minister to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to carry out a “complete siege” of Gaza. It is the most significant escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in more than a few decades.

Israel ordered more than one million Palestinian civilians in northern Gaza to leave ahead of a ground invasion that began on October 27th. The ground invasion began in the north in combination with Israel’s continued aerial assault.

The first stage of the ground attack ended on November 24 with the hostage-for-prisoner exchange that also allowed more aid into Gaza. After seven days, the war recommenced—particularly in Khan Younis, the largest city in southern Gaza that Israel claims is a Hamas stronghold.

In the interim, Syria’s state-owned SANA news agency quoted a military official as saying that missile strikes in the early hours of the morning had damaged air defense sites in the country’s southern region. The report blamed Israel.

The explosions in Isfahan and the attacks in Syria come amongst a steady escalation in tensions between the two Middle Eastern nations since Israel began its war on Gaza. While Israel and Iran have been locked in a “shadow war” for decades, recent months have brought tensions to a boiling point — and provoked worries about a wider regional conflict.

Here is a timeline of that recent escalation since the Gaza war broke out following an October 7 attack on Israel by the Palestinian group Hamas.

Speculation around Iran’s involvement in Hamas’s ghastly attack on Israel has been rampant along with questions about whether the Islamic Republic or any of its regional delegations will get involved in the war between Israel and Hamas.

Iran has denied involvement in planning the attack, but the country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praised the massacre in a televised address. “We kiss the hands of those who planned the attack on the Zionist regime,” Khamenei said. “The Zionist regime’s own actions are to blame for this disaster.” Hamas, for its part, has claimed sole responsibility for the attack on October 7, in which militants killed an estimated 1,200 Israelis, civilians, injured above 3,000, and took as many as 150 hostages.

It began when Hamas shooters launched an unparalleled attack on Israel from Gaza - the deadliest in Israel's history. An Israeli military campaign has followed, which has killed thousands in the Palestinian territory.

On the morning of 7 October, Hamas shooters stormed across Gaza's border into Israel, killing about 1,200 people. They also fired thousands of rockets. Those killed included children, the elderly and 364 young people at a music festival. 

Hamas became the sole ruler of Gaza after violently expelling political rivals in 2007. It has an armed wing and was thought to have about 30,000 fighters before the start of the war.

The group, whose name stands for Islamic Resistance Movement, wants to create an Islamic state in place of Israel. Hamas rejects Israel's right to exist and is committed to its destruction.

Hamas justified its attack as a response to what it calls Israeli crimes against the Palestinian people. These include security raids on Islam's third holiest site - the al-Aqsa Mosque, in occupied East Jerusalem - and Jewish settlement activity in the occupied West Bank.

Hamas also wants thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israel to be freed and for an end to the obstruction of the Gaza Strip by Israel and Egypt - something both countries say is for security.

It has fought several wars with Israel since it came to power, fired thousands of rockets, and carried out many other lethal attacks.

Israel has repeatedly attacked Hamas with air strikes and sent troops into Gaza in 2008 and 2014. Hamas, or in some cases its armed wing alone, is considered a terrorist group by Israel, the US, the EU, and the UK, among others. Iran backs Hamas with funding, weapons, and training.

Israel at once began a massive campaign of air strikes on targets in Gaza, in response to the Hamas attack. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel's aims were the obliteration of Hamas and the return of the prisoners.

Israel launched a ground invasion three weeks later. It also shelled Gaza from the sea.

Attacks were initially focused on northern Gaza, particularly Gaza City and tunnels beneath it, which Israel said were the centre of military actions by Hamas. All 1.1 million people living in the north were ordered by Israel to leave south for their safety.  Following a temporary truce in late November, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) extended ground operations to southern Gaza.

Troops reached the heart of the second biggest city, Khan Younis, where the IDF said it believed top Hamas commanders were hiding. The IDF also pushed into refugee camps in central Gaza.

More than 33,000 Palestinians have been killed, and tens of thousands injured by Israeli strikes since the start of the war, according to Gaza's Hamas-run health ministry. It says most were women and children.

Mr Netanyahu said in March that 13,000 Palestinian fighters had been killed, while about a month earlier the IDF said it had killed about 9,000 Hamas fighters, in addition to more than 1,000 of the invaders inside Israel on 7 October. It has not said how it came to this figure.

Israel says more than 250 of its soldiers have been killed in Gaza. Homes and other buildings in Gaza have suffered extensive damage and destruction. Most of the 253 men, women and children abducted by Hamas were civilians.

They included elderly people and those with disabilities and medical conditions. The youngest was nine months old.

In Gaza, Hamas hid them in tunnels and fighters' homes. Unconfirmed reports suggest some have been held by other militant groups. During November's truce, 105 hostages (81 Israelis and dual nationals, and 24 foreigners) were released in exchange for 240 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

Four hostages had previously been freed by Hamas and three rescued by the IDF - one on 29 October and two on 12 February. Three hostages were accidentally killed by Israeli troops who mistook them for Hamas fighters. The UN and aid agencies say Gaza is suffering severe shortages of food and other essentials including fuel and medicine. This is particularly severe in northern Gaza, where it is especially difficult to deliver aid which enters the territory from the south.

An UN-backed report says the situation across Gaza is turning into a man-made famine. Several children have famished to death in northern Gaza, the UN says.

Humanitarian agencies and Israel have blamed each other. Agencies say Israeli security checks on aid going into Gaza are complex and uninformed, causing major delays. Israel denies hampering aid and says agencies are not distributing the aid that is allowed in.

However, Israel has agreed to open a crossing into northern Gaza and allow its nearby port of Ashdod to receive consignments of aid, after sharp reproach from the US.

That came after the Israeli military killed seven aid workers in a drone attack, an occurrence which drew worldwide condemnation. Israel said the strike was a "grave mistake" due to misidentification.

Gaza's health system is in a state of collapse. Medical facilities are overcome by the vast number of injured and are struggling with shortages of staff, medical supplies, food, fuel, and water.

Hospitals have been repeatedly attacked by the Israeli military, which says it has been targeting Hamas shooters using the services as cover. A two-week raid on al-Shifa hospital in Gaza City in March left the complex in ruins and beyond use.

Talks aimed at reaching a second truce have stalled. Hamas says it wants an end to the war, for Israeli troops to withdraw from Gaza, for displaced people to return to their homes and an influx of aid.

Israel says it cannot allow Hamas to still be in control of Gaza and wants hostages released in return for a temporary pause in fighting. Israel says it plans to invade the southern town of Rafah, where about 1.5 million Palestinians have crowded to escape fighting elsewhere.

The Gaza Strip is a 41km (25-mile) long and 10km-wide area between Israel, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea. Previously occupied by Egypt, Gaza was captured by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War. Israel withdrew its troops and about 7,000 settlers from the territory in 2005.

Home to 2.2 million people, it is one of the world's most densely populated places. Just over three-quarters of Gaza's population are registered refugees, or descendants of refugees, the UN says. Israel controls the air space over Gaza, its shoreline, and its shared border, and limits the movement of people and goods.

The recent synchronized assault of Hamas on Israel invites suspicion of Iranian involvement. Tehran’s inspiration for derailing Israeli-Arab normalisation is clear, but is not the last word, as public anger is building against the regime’s support for proxies abroad.

The Iranian role in the clearly well-planned and well-coordinated Hamas attack by land, air, and sea on Israel is the subject of much discussion. That Iran has supported Hamas financially by the provision of rockets and arms and by training is well known. Iran’s modus operandi in the Middle East has long been to avoid direct involvement but act through proxies—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Gaza, and militias in Iraq—to expand its influence and achieve its policy goals. The long-term planning that made last week’s Hamas attack possible strongly suggests an Iranian role.

In fact, an article in the Wall Street Journal quotes senior members of Hamas and Hezbollah, saying that Iranian security agents and councils of the Revolutionary Guards were involved in the training and planning of the attack and, in a meeting in Beirut, gave Hamas permission. According to the WSJ, a European official and an adviser to the Syrian government confirmed this account.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said the US has not seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind Hamas’s military operation, but that may not be his last word on this matter; former US ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk took a nuanced view: Hamas does not take direction from Iran, he said, but synchronizes with it.

Iran, as expected, has denied any involvement in the planning efforts but applauded the attack. Iran’s inspiration, as well as that of Hamas, is clear. Several Arab states in the Persian Gulf have made peace with Israel. Saudi Arabia, the leading Arab state in the Gulf, has been involved in talks coordinated by President Biden, which could lead to recognition of Israel by the Saudis. Iran and Hamas have every interest to make sure that does not happen.

Having assumed the role of the principal opponent of Israel in the region, arming militias aiming at the devastation of Israel and engaging in provocative language against it, the Islamic Republic is playing a dangerous game, ignoring warnings from Israeli leaders that there will be consequences for those who play such a treacherous role.

The Islamic Republic’s massive support for Hamas is not necessarily shared by the Iranian people. In fact, the people resent the considerable monies the regime is spending on militias across the Middle East. According to a report on the web, audiences who walked into a Tehran stadium for a recent soccer game carrying Palestinian flags were booed by the crowd. In protests in Iranian cities against economic hardship and worsening conditions, demonstrators shouted slogans objecting to the money the regime was spending in support of Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and proxies in Syria.

But on one matter, Iranians and the rest of the world are on the same page: surprise that Israel’s famed intelligence agencies and its military did not detect preparations, months in the making, that resulted last week in the multi-pronged assault on their country by a weaker, smaller, and under-equipped enemy.

 

 

1. Role of the UN
   in the Iran-Israel war

Iran’s mission to the United Nations said in October 2024 that if Israel embarks on a “full-scale military aggression” in Lebanon against Hezbollah, “an obliterating war will ensue.”

The cautioning came after the Israel Defense Force attacked several Hezbollah positions, in response to the Iran-backed terror group’s latest bombardment on northern Israel amid escalating tensions on the Lebanese border.

Writing on X, the Iranian UN mission said that if Israel were to launch a war on Hezbollah, “all options, including the full involvement of all resistance fronts, are on the table.”

Allegedly to counter foreign state support for “terrorism,” Israel attacked an Iranian consulate building in Syria on 1 April 2024, killing two Iranian generals, General Mohammad Reza Zahedi and General Mohammad Hadi Hajriahimi, five other Iranian military officers, alleged Hezbollah member Hussein Youssef, and two Syrians. Two Syrian police officers defending the consulate were also injured. The residence of Iran’s Ambassador to Syria was found inside the building.

Iran responded by firing over 300 missiles and drones at Israel on 13 April, severely injuring a seven-year-old child and damaging a military facility.

“All countries are prohibited from arbitrarily grudging individuals of their right to life in military operations abroad, including when countering terrorism,” said the experts. “Killings in foreign territory are arbitrary when they are not authorized under international law,” they said.

The experts' said Israel does not appear to have been exercising self-defense on 1 April because it presented no evidence that Iran was directly committing an “armed attack” on Israel or sending non-state armed groups to attack it. The experts noted that Israel has not provided any legal justification for the strike or reported it to the Security Council, as required by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

“Israel’s attack consequently violated the prohibition on the use of armed force against another state under Article 2(4) of the Charter,” the experts said. “Illegal force was used not only against Iran’s armed forces but also against Syrian territory. Israel’s attack was partly launched from the Golan Heights, which is illegally annexed Syrian territory,” they said.

The experts warned that Israeli military personnel and officials responsible for the attack may also have committed crimes under an international counter-terrorism treaty of 1971, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons. “It is an offense to violently attack the official premises or private lodging of a diplomat where it is likely to endanger them. Iran, Israel, and Syria are all parties to the treaty, and all have criminal authority over such offences,” they recalled.

The experts said Iran’s response was also a prohibited use of force under international law. Israel’s strike on 1 April may have been serious enough to qualify as an “armed attack” on Iran since it targeted senior military commanders and diplomatic premises.

Yet Iran had no right of self-defense on 13 April because Israel’s attack concluded on 1 April. Self-defense is only lawful where it is necessary to stop a continuing armed attack. “Forcible retaliation, punishment or deterrence are illegal,” they warned.

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned the adversaries at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council not to further escalate tension in the region with further attacks, following mutual air attacks over the past two weeks. However, Iran and Israel concentrated on accusing one another of being a threat to peace.

Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel late on Saturday. The war in Gaza has triggered regular clashes between Iran’s regional allies – such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis – and Israel. The direct attack, a reprisal to a strike – still unclaimed by Israel – on Iran’s embassy compound in Syria on April 1, marked a serious escalation.

Foreign Minister Israel Katz responded on X: “If Hezbollah does not cease its fire and withdraw from southern Lebanon, we will act against it with full force until security is restored and residents can return to their homes. ⁠A regime that threatens destruction deserves to be destroyed.”

Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Hezbollah, Hamas, Yemen’s Houthis, and other groups in Syria and Iraq, has been targeting Israel since October 7, when thousands of Hamas-led terrorists stormed southern Israel, killing 1,200 people, and taking 251 hostages, sparking the war in Gaza.

Iran itself also launched an unprecedented missile-and-drone strike on Israel on April 14, two weeks after an alleged Israel airstrike near Tehran’s embassy in Damascus killed several senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Iranian strike was entirely resisted by Israel, the United States, and other allies, though a 7-year-old girl was seriously injured in the attack.

Soon after Hamas’s October 7 massacre, Israel evacuated many northern towns, fearing Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, would carry out a similar attack. Some 60,000 residents of northern Israel remain displaced, as the country seeks to remove the terror group from its northern border.

Israel and Iran traded barbs at the United Nations General Assembly meetings this week, with each accusing the other of responsibility for the deadly violence in Lebanon and Gaza.

While each side pressed its case in strong language, Iran’s framing distorts what triggered the Israel-Hamas war and whitewashes Tehran’s decades-long effort to destroy the state of Israel via proxy forces.

In his speech to the assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed what he called "the lies and slanders levelled at my country by many of the speakers at this podium."

Netanyahu said Iran, not Israel, handled the ongoing war in Gaza. He vowed to "continue degrading Hezbollah until all our objectives are met," and warned Tehran there is no place in the Middle East "that the long arm of Israel cannot reach."

Iran’s state officials and allies of the country voiced narratives at the United Nations painting Tehran as a constructive force "in the evolving global order" and Israel as an aggressor and an outcast.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian used the General Assembly platform to accuse Israel of portraying what he called "genocide" against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as "legitimate self-defense."

By contrast, he claimed Iranian foreign policy was intended to "safeguard its own security" and "not to create insecurity for others."

Addressing an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council on September 26, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Israel "does not deserve membership in the U.N."

He claimed Israel had driven the Middle East to "the brink of a broader conflict" due to its "aggression and heinous crimes against nations of the region. Now more than ever, Israel has become a serious threat to international peace and security," Araghchi said.

Reporting on Araghchi’s comments, Iran’s state-run Press TV framed Israel’s incursion into the Gaza Strip as a "brutal military onslaught against the coastal sliver."

While Iran accuses Israel of being the aggressor force, the war in the Gaza Strip started when militants from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other groups attacked towns and settlements in southern Israel, killing 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and taking some 250 hostages.

Iran has provided Hamas and Islamic Jihad with weapons, funding, and training. A day after the October 7 attack, Hezbollah began launching missiles into Israel, often into residential neighbourhoods. Those actions have displaced tens of thousands of Israelis.

Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shiite Muslim political party and militant group, has been instrumental in the decades-long Iran-Israel proxy conflict and the Israel-Lebanon conflict, including the 2006 Lebanon War, during which it launched indiscriminate attacks against Israeli civilians.

The Wall Street Journal, citing senior members of Hamas and Hezbollah, reported on October 8, 2023, that Iran helped plot the Hamas attack, and gave a "green light for the assault." Iran denies it played any role in the October 7 events.

On September 26, CNN’s Christiane Amanpour asked Javad Zarif, Iran's vice president for strategic affairs, if he supported Hamas’ October 7 attack on civilians. Zarif replied that "nobody supports actions against civilians" but added that "history did not start on October 7."

He continued, "… it’s not for us to decide whether the price that the Palestinians are paying is worth the fight."

Iran’s support for anti-Israel forces extends beyond Israel’s immediate neighbours.

The Houthis, a Shiite Islamist political and military organisation in Yemen, has also targeted Israel. Houthi attacks have paralysed vital world commercial traffic in the Red Sea since the Israel-Hamas war began.

On September 26, Reuters, citing U.N. sanctions monitors, reported that Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps had helped the Houthi rebels grow "from a localized armed group with limited capabilities to a powerful military organization."

The Revolutionary Guard’s external operations arm, the IRGC-Quds Force, has been instrumental in supporting this so-called "axis of resistance," which by some estimates entails over 100 Shiite militias disseminating instability throughout the Middle East.

The multi-pronged attack Israel is facing reflects what Israeli leaders and analysts have described as Iran’s "ring of fire" — an Iranian-backed network of militias based in states surrounding Israel.

This ring of fire allows Iran to strike Israel via proxies, while keeping conceivable deniability. The level of influence Tehran keeps over these groups it spent billions of dollars creating is unclear, and analysts argue the militant groups risk dragging Iran into a war with Israel.

Israel has faced legitimate criticism for the rising casualties of its military operations in Gaza, with the death toll reaching 41,534 people as of September 26.

These death statistics come from the Hamas-run health ministry. The ministry does not distinguish between combatant and civilian deaths. Similarly, Lebanese officials say 700 people have been killed amid Israel’s intensifying bombing campaign since September 23.

International Criminal Court, or ICC, Prosecutor Karim Khan is seeking arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as several Hamas leaders, for crimes against humanity.

Israel has questioned the ICC’s authority in the proceedings, claiming they have not been given the opportunity to investigate the allegations. Israel is not a state party to the ICC, which is a court of last resort, meaning it can only exercise its authority when the accused country will not or cannot investigate the alleged crimes.

On September 20, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oren Marmorstein said Israel stays committed to the rule of law but would also "continue to defend its citizens" against attacks from Hamas and "Iran’s other terrorist arms."

“I call for an immediate cessation of these hostilities,” said the UN Secretary-General in a statement issued in New York early Saturday evening, shortly after global media outlets reported that Iran had launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel.

The UN chief said that he is deeply alarmed about the very real danger of a devastating region-wide escalation.

“I urge all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid any action that could lead to major military confrontations on multiple fronts in the Middle East,” said the Secretary-General, and added: “I have repeatedly stressed that neither the region nor the world can afford another war.” 

Tensions have been intensifying up in the region since Hamas’ deadly 7 October terror attack and mass hostage taking and Israel’s later full-scale assault on the Gaza Strip, which has left thousands dead and pushed the population to the brink of starvation. The UN Security Council has scheduled an emergency meeting to discuss this latest flare-up in the region.

For his part, the President of the UN General Assembly, Dennis Francis, also expressed deep concern about the unfolding situation in the Middle East, “involving the launch by Iran of drones and missiles against Israel.” 

In a separate statement, Mr. Francis noted that Iran had explained its action “in the context of article 51 of the UN Charter, following the recent Israeli attack on the Iranian Embassy in Damascus.”

“The Iranian response compounds the already tense and delicate peace and security situation in the Middle East,” said the Assembly President and strongly called upon all parties to exercise the utmost check to avoid further escalation of tension in the region.

“This is a moment that calls for wise and prudent judgement, in which the risks and extended risks are very carefully considered. I expect that the Iranian authorities will honour their word that by their action today, the matter can be believed concluded.”

Stressing that dialogue and diplomacy are the only way to resolve differences, Mr. Francis warned: “A vicious cycle of attack and counterattack will lead to nowhere, but inevitably, to more death, suffering and misery.”

Sounding the alarm that “hell is breaking loose in Lebanon”, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres urged the Security Council in an emergency meeting to call on Hizbullah and Israel to pull back from the brink of a potentially catastrophic regional war.

Briefing the Council this evening, Secretary-General Guterres noted that Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon and the Israel Defense Forces have recently exchanged fire on an almost daily basis — in violation of Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). Lebanese sovereignty must be respected, with full control of weapons throughout its territory. Since October, 200,000 people within Lebanon and over 60,000 from northern Israel have fled their homes, with many lives lost. “All this must stop,” he declared.

In the wake of the remote ignition of pagers and handheld radios used by Hizbullah: “Monday was the bloodiest day in Lebanon in a generation, with a reported 569 people killed on Monday and Tuesday, including 40 children and 94 women,” Secretary-General Guterres continued. Further, $170 million is needed to respond to the humanitarian needs of massive displacement in Lebanon; meanwhile, the people of Israel have endured repeated attacks from Hizbullah with more than 8,300 rockets, drones and increasingly high calibre missile attacks on military targets and residential areas.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Ongoing tensions between
   Israel-Lebanon
   
   

Al-Jazeera stated that Lebanon has seen another bloody day as relentless Israeli assault killed at least 105 people across the country and injured 359 others, according to health officials.

A single attack in Ain al-Delb near the southern Sidon flattened two residential buildings, killing 32 people, Lebanon’s Health Ministry said. Many families sheltering at the site were among the victims.

While Israel said it attacked dozens of Hezbollah targets, Lebanese officials said the bombing struck homes and buildings in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa, Baalbek-Hermel governor-ate and the southern suburbs of Beirut.

In the early hours of Monday, local media outlets reported an Israeli air strike in the Kola bridge area in the heart of Beirut. The shelling is Israel’s first attack within the city limits since the start of the hostilities last year and will be seen as another escalation of the fight.

Tensions between Israel and Lebanon-based Hezbollah, already high since the start of the war in Gaza in October 2023, have risen sharply in recent days. Forty-eight hours after the deaths of 12 Druze children, killed by rocket fire on July 28 in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, Israel conducted a strike on the outskirts of Beirut to cut Fouad Shukur, one of the Shiite movement's most senior military officers, considered by the Israelis to handle the attack. The reaction of Hezbollah's leader, who promised a "well-studied retaliation" and said "we are facing a major battle," has some observers fearing a regional escalation.

The Israeli Lebanese conflict, or the South Lebanon conflict, is a series of military clashes involving Israel, Lebanon-based paramilitary groups, and sometimes Syria. The conflict peaked during the Lebanese Civil War. In response to Palestinian attacks from Lebanon, Israel invaded in 1978 and again in 1982. After this it occupied southern Lebanon until 2000, while fighting a guerrilla conflict against Shia paramilitaries. After Israel's withdrawal, Hezbollah attacks sparked the 2006 Lebanon War. A new period of conflict began in 2023 following the October 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) enlisted militants in Lebanon from among the Palestinian refugees who had been expelled or fled after the creation of Israel in 1948. After the PLO leadership and its Fatah brigade were debarred from Jordan in 1970–71 for fomenting a revolt, they entered southern Lebanon, resulting in an increase of internal and cross-border violence. Meanwhile, demographic tensions over the Lebanese National Pact led to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990).

PLO actions were one of the key factors in the eruption of the Lebanese Civil War and its bitter battles with Lebanese factions caused foreign involvement. Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon pushed the PLO north of the Litani River, but the PLO continued their campaign against Israel. This invasion led to the disposition of United Nations peacekeepers in southern Lebanon.

Israel invaded Lebanon again in 1982 and, in alliance with the Christian Lebanese Forces, forcibly expelled the PLO. In 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed the May 17 Agreement providing a framework for the establishment of normal bilateral relations between the two countries, but relations were upset with takeover of Shia and Druze militias in early 1984. Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon in 1985 but kept control of a 19-kilometre (12-mile) security buffer zone, held with the aid of proxy militants in the South Lebanon Army (SLA).

In 1985, Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia Islamist movement sponsored by Iran, called for armed struggle to end the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory. It fought a guerrilla war against the IDF and SLA in south Lebanon. Israel launched two major operations in southern Lebanon during the 1990s: Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996.

Fighting with Hezbollah weakened Israeli resolve and led to a collapse of the SLA and an Israeli withdrawal in 2000 to their side of the UN nominated border.

Citing Israeli control of the Shebaa farms, Hezbollah continued cross-border attacks intermittently over the next six years. Hezbollah now sought the release of Lebanese citizens in Israeli prisons and successfully used the tactic of capturing Israeli soldiers as control for a prisoner exchange in 2004. The capturing of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah kindled the 2006 Lebanon War. Its ceasefire called for the disarmament of Hezbollah and the respecting of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon by Israel. Hostilities were suspended on 8 September 2006.

After the 2006 war, the situation became relatively calm, despite both sides violating the ceasefire agreements; Israel by making near-daily flights over Lebanese territory, and Hezbollah by not disarming. There was an increase in violence during the April 2023 Israel–Lebanon shellings.

The Israel–Hamas war sparked a renewed Israel–Hezbollah conflict, beginning one day after the October 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel. The conflict initially consisted of tit-for-tat airstrikes and shelling.

However, in 2024, events both inside and outside of Lebanon escalated the conflict. These include the Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April, the Majdal Shams attack and assassinations of Fuad Shukr and Ismail Haniyeh in July, and the Nabatieh attack and strikes by both sides in August.

Starting with the Israeli explosion of Lebanese pagers and walkie talkies in September 2024, the conflict escalated severely, with the September 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon killing at least 569 and sparking a mass evacuation of Southern Lebanon. This was the largest conflict-related loss of life in a single day in Lebanon since the Lebanese Civil War.

The regions of what would become the states of Israel and Lebanon were once part of the Ottoman Empire which lasted from 1299 until its defeat in World War I and later dissolution in 1922. As a result of the Sinai and Palestine Campaign in 1917, the British occupied Palestine and parts of what would become Syria. French troops took Damascus in 1918. The League of Nations officially gave the French the Mandate of Syria and the British the Mandate of Palestine after the 1920 San Remo conference, following the 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement.

The Christian enclave of the French Mandate became the French-controlled Lebanese Republic in 1926. Lebanon became independent in 1943 as France was under German occupation, though French troops did not completely withdraw until 1946.

The rise of anti-Semitism in Europe, culminating in the Holocaust during World War II, had meant an increase of Jewish immigrants to a minority Jewish, majority Arab Mandate. During the 1936–39 Arab revolt and thereafter the British increasingly came to rely on Jewish police forces to help support order.

Ultimately, the resultant rise in ethnic tensions and violence between the Arabs and Jews due to Jewish immigration and collaboration would force the British to withdraw in 1947. (The area of their mandate east of the Jordan river had already become the independent state of Jordan in 1946.) The United Nations General Assembly developed a gerrymandered 1947 UN Partition Plan, to attempt to give both Arabs and Jews their own states from the remains of the British Mandate; however, this was rejected by the Arabs, and the situation quickly devolved into a full-fledged civil war.

In 1948, the Lebanese army had by far the smallest regional army, consisting of only 3,500 soldiers. At the prompting of Arab leaders in the region, Lebanon agreed to join the other armies that were being assembled around the boundary of the British Mandate territory of Palestine for the purpose of invading Palestine. Lebanon committed 1,000 of these soldiers to the cause. The Arab armies waited for the end of the Mandate and the taking out of British forces, which was set for 15 May 1948.

Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948. The next day, the British Mandate officially expired and, in an official cablegram, the seven-member Arab League, including Lebanon, publicly proclaimed their aim of creating a democratic "United State of Palestine" in place of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine.

The League soon entered the conflict on the side of the Palestinian Arabs, thus beginning the international phase of the 1948 Arab Israeli War. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq declared war on the new state of Israel. They expected an easy and quick victory in what came to be called the 1948 Arab Israeli War. The Lebanese army joined the other Arab armies in the attack. It crossed into the northern Galilee. By the end of the conflict, however, it had been repelled by Israeli forces, which occupied South Lebanon. Israel signed armistice agreements with each of its invading neighbors. The armistice with Lebanon was signed on 23 March 1949. As part of the agreement with Lebanon, Israeli forces withdrew to the international border.

By the conclusion of that war, Israel had signed ceasefire agreements with all the neighbouring Arab countries. The territory it now controlled went well beyond what had been distributed to it under the United Nations Partition Plan, incorporating much of what had been promised to the Palestinian Arabs under the Plan. However, it was understood by all the state parties at the time that the armistice agreements were not peace treaties with Israel, nor the final resolution of the conflict between them, including the borders.

After the war, the United Nations estimated 711,000 Palestinian Arabs, out of an estimated 1.8 million dwelling in the Mandate of Palestine, fled, emigrated, or were forced out of Israel and entered neighbouring countries. By 1949, there were 110,000 Palestinian Arabs in Lebanon, moved into camps set up by and administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

Except for two camps in the Beirut area, the camps were mostly Muslim. Lebanese Christians feared that the Muslim influx would affect their political dominance and their assumed demographic majority.

So, they imposed restrictions on the status of the Palestinian refugees. The refugees could not work, travel, or engage in political activities. Initially the refugees were too poor to develop a leadership capable of airing their concerns. Less democratic regimes also feared the threat the refugees posed to their own rule, but Lebanon would prove too weak to keep a crackdown.

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) recruited militants in Lebanon from among the families of Palestinian refugees who had left Israel in 1948.

On 12 July 2006, in an incident known as Zar'it-Shtula, the Hezbollah started diversionary rocket attacks on Israeli military positions near the coast and near the Israeli border village of Zar'it, while another Hezbollah group crossed from Lebanon into Israel and waylaid two Israeli Army vehicles, killing three Israeli soldiers, and seizing two.

Hezbollah promptly demanded the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel, including Samir Kuntar and an alleged surviving perpetrator of the Coastal Road massacre, in exchange for the release of the captured soldiers.

Heavy fire between the sides was exchanged across the length of the Blue Line, with Hezbollah targeting IDF positions near Israeli towns.

Thus, began the 2006 Lebanon War. Israel responded with massive airstrikes and artillery fire on targets throughout Lebanon, an air and naval barricade, and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. In Lebanon, the battle killed over 1,100 people, including combatants, severely damaged infrastructure, and displaced about one million people.

Israel suffered 42 civilian deaths because of prolonged rocket attacks being launched into northern Israel causing the displacement of half a million Israelis. Normal life across much of Lebanon and northern Israel was disrupted, in addition to the deaths in combat.

A United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect on 14 August 2006. The blockade was lifted on 8 September.

Since the civil war, Israel has routinely breached Lebanese airspace, waters, and borders, which is illegal since it violates Lebanon's territory and United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 and 1701.

The most frequent breaches are over flights by Israeli war planes and drones; such violations have occurred since the start of the Israeli Lebanese conflict and have happened continuously and daily since the 2006 Lebanon war, being the source of much conflict between Lebanon and Israel. Reporting estimates over 22,000 Israeli intrusions into Lebanese airspace have occurred since 2007. Israeli warplanes sometimes stage mock attacks on Lebanese cities and emit sonic booms that frighten civilians.

In 2007 the Lebanese government complained that Israeli planes had flown into Lebanese airspace 290 times within four months, and that Israeli troops had crossed the border 52 times.

In 2006 French Defence Minister Michele Alliot-Marie stated: "I remind that the violations of the airspace are extremely dangerous, they are dangerous first because they may be felt as hostile by forces of the coalition that could be brought to hit back in cases of self defence and it would be a very serious incident." US officials on visit in Israel also demanded that Israel stop the overflights since they undermined the standing of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.

Satellite mapping of the strikes by Al Jazeera shows attacks across Lebanon, with the highest concentration in the south and the Bekaa Valley, where Hezbollah’s influence is considered strongest.

Before the attacks, some 80,000 phone calls from the Israeli army to Lebanese people – predominantly in the south – were reported, urging them to evacuate their homes and find “safety”.

The result was panic, chaos and bottlenecks, with the main coastal road to the capital, Beirut, gridlocked for several kilometres as residents tried to flee an impending attack.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Total casualties in the
   Iran-Israel war

The Iran-Israel war had been one of the most destructive conflicts of the late 20th century. The total number of soldiers on both sides is unclear, but both countries were fully mobilized, and most men of military age were under arms. The number of casualties was enormous but equally uncertain. Estimates of total casualties range from 1,000,000 to twice that number. The number killed on both sides was perhaps 500,000, with Iran suffering the highest losses. It is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed by Iraqi forces during the series of operations code-named Anfāl (Arabic: “Spoils”) that took place in 1988.

In August 1990, while Iraq was preoccupied with its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq and Iran restored diplomatic relations, and Iraq agreed to Iranian terms for the settlement of the war: the taking out of Iraqi troops from occupied Iranian territory, division of sovereignty over the Shaṭṭ Al-ʿArab waterway, and a prisoner-of-war exchange. The final exchange of prisoners was not completed until March 2003.

Israeli strikes killed over 100 people and wounded over 350 others in Lebanon in 2023. The Israeli military said it was striking Hezbollah, including in attacks by fighter jets on about 45 targets near a village in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s leadership is shrinking, with at least three senior commanders confirmed killed, including Nabil Qaouk, a key commander and member of Hezbollah’s central council. Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed in a strike on the group’s underground headquarters, where 20 Hezbollah members were also present, including the head of Nasrallah’s security unit.

Israel’s military also struck what it said were power plants and a seaport used by the Houthis in Yemen, killing at least four people and wounding dozens more. The Houthis, like Hamas and Hezbollah, are among the Iran-backed militant groups battling Israel since the war in Gaza began.

Aid warnings: An increase of the conflict in Lebanon would have “extremely dire consequences” for the already worsening humanitarian situation in the country, the aid agency Relief International said. Hundreds of thousands of people have been forced onto the streets as Israeli strikes destroy homes and infrastructure.

US President Joe Biden said he is “working like hell” with allies to prevent an all-out war in the Middle East. Before Nasrallah’s killing, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu brushed off a ceasefire proposal brokered by the US.

Iran lost its most dependable ally in the Middle East when an Israeli airstrike killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. But Iran isn’t leading the charge to retaliate.

That’s put Tehran in a bind: Not responding could see it estrange the militias it relies on in the region. Meanwhile, any possible vengeance risks a wider war as its theocracy faces intense challenges at home.

 

“By the grace and power of God, Lebanon will make the transgressing, malicious enemy regret its actions,” Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in the wake of Nasrallah’s death. But the 85-year-old paramount ruler in Iran gave no mention of his country taking action over the death of a man he once praised as “an exceptional face in the world of Islam” after the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006.

That reluctance continued, as Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani told journalists that “the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian people are not after war” but rather “peace and stability in the region.”

Though Kanaani added that, “any adventurous move or action against our national security or interests and our hands will never be tied,” at one point wearing a checkered Palestinian keffiyeh scarf during his remarks.

These comments highlight a caginess in responding to Nasrallah’s death. Though his leadership of Hezbollah was the crown jewel in Iran’s decades-long strategy of arming regional militias to counter both Israel and the United States, Iran remains cautious about when — or if — it will strike back.

That’s not to say that it hasn’t launched reciprocal strikes during the yearlong Israel-Hamas war that’s divided the Middle East and threatens to erupt into a regional battle. Iran launched a first-time direct attack on Israel in April. It even launched a missile strike against sites in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan in January.

But those attacks stemmed from direct attacks on Iranian targets, like the suspected Israeli strike on an Iranian diplomatic post in Syria.

“Iran, I think in its priorities has been very much misunderstood since Oct. 8,” said Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the London-based international affairs think tank Chatham House. “There was a misconception Iran would pile in.”

Instead, it hung back after Hamas — another militant group it has armed — launched its Oct. 7, 2024 attack on Israel that killed 1,200 people and saw another 250 taken hostage. Even as millions of Iranians purportedly volunteered online to fight on behalf of the Palestinians, Iran didn’t enter the war as an Israeli offensive devastated the Gaza Strip, killing over 41,000 people.

In the time since, an increasingly emboldened Israel has attacked Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthi rebels and other groups. In marking Nasrallah’s killing, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cited a line in the Jewish Talmud fitting that strategy — “If someone rises up to kill you, kill him first.”

For Netanyahu, whose political career has revolved around the threat he perceives from Iran, that includes striking back at those Iranian allies Tehran refers to as the “Axis of Resistance.” Those militias grew in prominence and power in the chaos that followed the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the 2011 Arab Spring and the rise of Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

That created what Iran’s adversaries feared would become a “Shiite crescent” of influence that Tehran would be able to wield, something Israel may be aiming to roll back.

“An increasingly emboldened Israel appears to be considering a more expansive plan to confront Iran across the Middle East with the ambition of creating a new regional order,” said Julien Barnes-Dacey, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “This is a dangerous illusion. Despite Iran’s current weakness, this will be seen as an existential threat by Tehran and its regional allies.”

Iran could encourage more lop-sided attacks, targeting Jewish tourists, synagogues or Israeli diplomatic missions as it has done in the past. Netanyahu issued a warning to Iran likely over that risk, saying: “There is nowhere in the Middle East Israel cannot reach.”

Tehran also could weaponize its nuclear program. It already enriches uranium to near-weapons-grade levels after the collapse of its 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. Hard-line voices within Iran’s theocracy, like its daily Kahyan newspaper, already are calling for a response “harsher” than its April attack, which caused very little damage.

That, however, runs directly opposite to the plans of Iran’s new reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian, who campaigned on a promise to get crushing economic sanctions lifted against Iran. That’s grown in importance as energy prices continue to fall and Iran likely sells its oil at a discount due to being locked out of many nations.

If nuclear deal “commitments are implemented fully and in good faith, dialogue on other issues can follow,” Pezeshkian told the United Nations General Assembly last week.

Ending the sanctions requires a deal with the West on the nuclear program, something that will become nearly impossible if Iran enters an all-out war with Israel. Relieving that economic pressure remains crucial for Iran’s domestic stability as well, as authorities remember the months of protests that followed the 2022 death of Mahsa Amini.

“For the time being it appears the president and the supreme leader, the latter who is abundantly cautious, want to keep the line open to dialogue and negotiations,” Vakil said.

And to keep that line open, Iran needs someone else to take the lead against Israel.

“The Iranian leadership is prepared to accept a humiliating retreat in the face of Israeli strikes in the short term to safeguard the regime in the long run, and this explains Tehran’s lack of retaliation so far,” said Alex Vatanka, the director of the Iran Program at the Washington-based Middle East Institute.

The IDF said that ground forces will operate to target Hezbollah fighters and set-up in villages along the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF said that Hezbollah infrastructure in these villages represents an “immediate and real” threat to Israeli communities in the north. Israeli military and political officials formally approved the ”next steps” of Israel’s operation in Lebanon on September 30. The IDF said it will act to achieve its stated war aim of returning the residents of the north to their homes.

Western media reported on September 30 that the IDF conducted several smaller incursions in the past week, but CTP-ISW has not yet observed large Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen reported on September 30 that Israeli units are concentrated at several positions along the Israel-Lebanon border. This report is consistent with information reported by Western media. Hezbollah claimed cross-border attacks targeting Israeli forces concentrated near the border on September 30. Hezbollah mortared Israeli forces gathered in the border town Shtula.”

Hezbollah also claimed that it attacked Israeli soldiers in groves near the Lebanese towns Kfar Kila and Addasiya. It is not clear if this attack took place in Israel or Lebanon. Saudi-owned outlets reported that Israeli tanks entered Ramish in southern Lebanon, but later deleted the reports. There has been no validation of these now-deleted reports.

Local Lebanese sources and Arabic-language media reported that the IDF conducted several hours of artillery shelling and fired illumination rounds over several Lebanese border towns on September 30. Arabic-language media also reported that the IDF called upon residents in Lebanese border towns to evacuate. A Lebanese security source told CNN that the Lebanese army evacuated its observation posts along the Israel-Lebanon border and moved into barracks in border villages.

The IDF Northern Command issued a closed military zone over the northern Israeli towns Metula, Misgav Am, and Kfar Giladi, along the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF prohibited civilian entry to the area.

The IDF has been preparing for the possibility of a ground invasion into Lebanon by calling up reservist units and deploying the 98th Division to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent weeks. IDF commanders from the Northern Command and IDF 36th, 98th, and 91st divisions recently approved plans for the ”coming days” along the northern front. These formations have conducted several training exercises in recent days to prepare for the operation, including exercises that simulated a ground offensive into Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant visited the 188th Armored Brigade (36th Division) on the border on September 30 and said that the IDF will use all its capabilities, including ground forces, to return residents to the north.

Western media reported on September 30 that Israeli special operations forces have already been conducting cross-border raids “to gather intelligence” ahead of the operation since last week, citing unspecified sources. The raids reportedly included entering Hezbollah tunnels along the border.

One such Israeli cross-border raid occurred near the Lebanese town of Alma al Shaab on an unspecified date last week. The IDF’s ground operation will take place as the IDF continues its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's capabilities with the objective of returning residents to the north.

US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said that Israel had informed the US about “a series of limited ground operations” it was planning into Lebanon that would focus on Hezbollah infrastructure near the Israel-Lebanon border.

The term ”limited” presumably refers only to the specific IDF operations to clear border infrastructure and is not necessarily applicable to the entirety of a potential Israeli ground campaign. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi recently told Israeli soldiers that the IDF is preparing for manoeuvre operations that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah militants and advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are Hezbollah “military outposts.”

The IDF struck dozens of targets throughout Lebanon, including Hezbollah air defense systems. The IDF destroyed a warehouse of surface-to-air missile launchers near the Beirut International Airport. Israel’s air campaign also continued to eliminate Hezbollah missile and rocket system commanders. An IDF airstrike in Beirut killed the commander of Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket forces on September 28. The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson also said on September 30 that the IDF had also killed the commander of Hezbollah’s precision missile unit in southern Lebanon, his deputy, and other commanders of the unit in southern Lebanon.

The IDF’s degradation of Hezbollah’s weapons capabilities and the commanders with knowledge of these systems fit into Israeli war objectives for Lebanon, which would require the disruption or degradation of Hezbollah’s ability to fire rockets into northern Israel. Syrian sources also reported Israeli drones and explosions near Qudsaya, outside west Damascus, on September 30. Israel has previously conducted airstrikes in Rif Dimashq and near the Lebanon-Syria border to disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to receive weapons.

The IDF struck and killed Hamas commander in Lebanon Fatah Abu al Amin in a refugee camp in Tyre on September 29. Amin coordinated Hamas’ activities in Lebanon and helped to recruit Hamas operatives and purchase weapons. The IDF also struck and killed two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in southern Lebanon on September 29.

Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine acknowledged the death of their members in Lebanon on September 30. Hezbollah commonly allows Palestinian groups to launch attacks on Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory in Lebanon.

Previous IDF strikes in southern Lebanon throughout the war have killed fighters from multiple Palestinian militias, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Resistance Committees.

Israeli strikes have severely degraded Hezbollah leadership in recent weeks, killing Nasrallah and numerous strategic- and operational-level leaders. Qassem said in his speech that Hezbollah is structured to enable it to continue operations against Israel despite the loss of leadership, and deputy commanders are prepared to step forward to take up their units’ command.

Qassem said that Hezbollah’s “resistance forces are ready” to engage an Israeli ground invasion and will not “budge an inch from [Hezbollah’s positions] regardless of the destruction to Hezbollah’s leadership. Qassem’s comments likely seek to soften concerns among Hezbollah’s rank-and-file that Hezbollah leadership remains strong and able to survive ahead of potential ground engagements with Israel. Qassem lastly said that Hezbollah will choose a new secretary-general as soon as possible and according to the approved party mechanisms.

Hezbollah will likely rapidly promote lower-ranking commanders to take the place of those Israel has killed, but the loss of long-serving strategic- and operational-level commanders will create temporary disruption in Hezbollah’s command-and-control.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. China's conflict with
   Taiwan and the USA

Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), is an island separated from China by the Taiwan Strait. It has been governed independently from mainland China, officially the People’s Republic of China (PRC), since 1949. The PRC views the island as a renegade province and vows to eventually “unify” Taiwan with the mainland.

In Taiwan, which has its own democratically elected government and is home to twenty-three million people, political leaders have differing views on the island’s status and relations with the mainland.

Cross-strait tensions have intensified since the election of former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016. Tsai refused to accept a formula that her precursor, Ma Ying-jeou, endorsed to allow for increased cross-strait ties.

In the interim, Beijing has taken increasingly aggressive actions, which includes flying fighter jets near the island. Some analysts fear a Chinese attack on Taiwan has the possibility to draw the United States into a war with China.

Beijing asserts that there is only “one China,” and that Taiwan is part of it. It views the PRC as the only legitimate government of China, an approach it calls the One China principle, and seeks Taiwan’s final “unification” with the mainland.

Beijing claims that Taiwan is bound by an understanding known as the 1992 Consensus, which was reached between representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) party that then ruled Taiwan. However, the two sides do not agree on the content of this so-called accord, and it was never intended to address the question of Taiwan’s legal status.

For the PRC, as Chinese President Xi Jinping has said, the 1992 Consensus reflects an agreement that “the two sides of the strait belong to one China and would work together to seek national reunification.” For the KMT, it means “one China, different interpretations,” with the ROC standing as the “one China.”

China rejects Taiwan’s partaking as a member in UN agencies and other international organizations that limit membership to states. Taipei regularly protests its exclusion; the United States also pushes for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in such organizations.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Taipei criticized the World Health Organization (WHO) for giving in to Beijing’s demands and continuing to bar Taiwan—which mounted one of the world’s most effective responses to COVID-19 in the first two years of the pandemic—from attending the organization’s World Health Assembly as an observer. Ministers from the Group of Seven (G7) countries have called for Taiwan’s inclusion in WHO forums.

Taiwan does, however, hold member status in more than forty organizations, most of them regional, such as the Asian Development Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, as well as in the World Trade Organization. It holds observer or other status on several other bodies.

Only twelve states support official diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In March 2023, Honduras severed ties with Taiwan and established relations with China, and in January 2024, just days after Taiwan’s presidential election, so did the Pacific Island nation of Nauru. No government has ever simultaneously supported formal diplomatic ties with both China and Taiwan.

The visit by US speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan is not being well received by China. It has sparked intense tensions between the two powerful countries - China and US as China sees Taiwan as a breakaway province.

Taiwan, which considers itself a sovereign nation, has long been claimed by China, who considers Taiwan to be its breakaway province. Yet Taiwan also counts the US as its biggest ally, and Washington has a law that requires it to aid Taiwan in defending itself.

Relations started improving in the 1980s as Taiwan relaxed rules on visits to and investment in China. In 1991, the ROC proclaimed that the war with the People's Republic of China was over.

China proposed the so-called "one country, two systems" option, which it said would allow Taiwan significant autonomy if it agreed to come under Beijing's control.

This system underpinned Hong Kong's return to China in 1997 and the way it was governed until recently, when Beijing has sought to increase its influence.

Taiwan rejected the offer, leading Beijing to insist the Taiwan's ROC government was illegitimate - but unofficial representatives from China and Taiwan still held limited talks.

Then in 2000, Taiwan elected Chen Shui-bian as president, much to Beijing's alarm. Mr Chen and his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), had openly backed Taiwan "independence".

Some Western experts predict that Taiwan could at best aim to slow a Chinese attack, try to prevent a shore landing by amphibious forces, and mount guerrilla strikes while waiting for outside help. And that help could come from the US.

But for decades Washington has walked a diplomatic tightrope between Beijing and Taipei - and has been intentionally unclear about whether or how it would defend Taiwan in an attack.

US-China ties have, however, soured in recent years. And Beijing often accuses the US of defaulting on its "One-China" policy, which recognizes only one Chinese government, in Beijing. But Washington denies this, saying the status quo has not changed.

China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. The exercises strengthen what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan.

Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this.

But many Taiwanese consider themselves to be part of a separate nation - although most are in favour of keeping the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor unites with it.

Taiwan's first known settlers were Austronesian tribal people, believed to have come from modern day southern China.

Chinese records first mention the island in AD 239, when an emperor dispatched an expeditionary force to it - a fact Beijing uses to back its territorial claim.

After a relatively brief spell as a Dutch colony, Taiwan was administered by China's Qing dynasty, before it was ceded to Tokyo after Japan won the First Sino-Japanese War.

After World War II, Japan surrendered and renounced control of territory it had taken from China. Afterwards, Taiwan was officially considered occupied by the Republic of China (ROC), which began ruling with the consent of its allies, the US and UK.

But in the next few years a civil war broke out in China, and then-leader Chiang Kai-shek's troops were defeated by Mao Zedong's Communist army. Chiang, the remnants of his Kuomintang (KMT) government and their supporters - about 1.5m people - fled to Taiwan in 1949.

Chiang set up a dictatorship that ruled Taiwan until the 1980s. Following his death, Taiwan began a transition to democracy and held its first elections in 1996.

There is disagreement about the status of Taiwan. It has its own constitution, democratically elected leaders, and about 300,000 active troops in its armed forces.

Chiang's ROC government-in-exile at first claimed to stand for the whole of China, which it intended to re-occupy. It held China's seat on the United Nations Security Council and was recognised by many Western nations as the only Chinese government.

But by the 1970s some countries began to argue that the Taipei government could no longer be considered a genuine representative of the people living in mainland China.

In 1971, the UN switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing. Once China began opening its economy in 1978, the US recognised opportunities for trade and the need to develop relations. It formally improved diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1979.

Since then, the number of countries that recognise the ROC government has fallen drastically with only 12 countries recognising the island today. China exerts considerable diplomatic weight on other countries not to recognise Taiwan.

Relations started improving in the 1980s as Taiwan relaxed rules on visits to and investment in China. In 1991, the ROC proclaimed that the war with the People's Republic of China was over.

China proposed the so-called "one country, two systems" option, which it said would allow Taiwan significant autonomy if it agreed to come under Beijing's control.

This system underpinned Hong Kong's return to China in 1997 and the way it was governed until recently, when Beijing has sought to increase its influence.

Taiwan rejected the offer, leading Beijing to insist the Taiwan's ROC government was illegitimate - but unofficial representatives from China and Taiwan still held limited talks.

Then in 2000, Taiwan elected Chen Shui-bian as president, much to Beijing's alarm.

Mr Chen and his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), had openly backed Taiwan "independence". A year after Mr Chen was re-elected in 2004, China passed a so-called anti-secession law, declaring China's right to use "non-peaceful means" against Taiwan if it tried to "secede" from China.

Mr Chen was later succeeded by the KMT, which favours closer relations with the PRC. In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen, from the DPP, was elected to the presidency. Under her, cross-strait relations have soured. China also cut off official communications with Taiwan after Ms Tsai took over, saying it was because of her refusal to endorse the concept of a single Chinese nation.

Ms Tsai has never said she will formally declare Taiwan's independence, insisting that it is already independent.

But Ms Tai's term also coincided with that of Xi Jinping, under whom Chinese claims have grown more aggressive. He has reiterated the message that China will "surely be reunified" with Taiwan and has set 2049 as a target date for "achieving the Chinese dream".

In January 2024, Taiwan elected Ms Tsai's vice-president, William Lai, as president - a man China has branded him a "separatist".

Thursday's drills came in his first week in office - and Beijing said they are a "strong punishment" for "separatist acts" and singled out Mr Lai as the "worst of all" DPP presidents so far.

The US maintains official ties with Beijing, and recognises it as the only Chinese government under its "One China policy" - but it also remains Taiwan's most significant international supporter. 

Washington is bound by law to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons and US President Joe Biden has said that the US would defend Taiwan militarily - breaking with a stance known as strategic ambiguity.

The island has long been one of the prickly issues in US-China relations, with Beijing condemning any perceived support from Washington for Taipei. In 2022, after a visit to Taiwan by US Speaker Nancy Pelosi, China responded with an extraordinary show of force, carrying out military exercises around Taiwan in retaliation.

Under President Xi, China has ramped up this "grey zone warfare" - sending record numbers of Chinese fighter jets near Taiwan and holding military drills in response to political exchanges between the US and Taiwan. In 2022, China's warplane incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) nearly doubled. 

The results of the elections will shape the course of US-China relations - and no matter who walks away the winner, will have a permanent impact on the delicate relationship between the US, China, and Taiwan.

In 1979, the United States established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. At the same time, it severed its diplomatic ties and abrogated its mutual defence treaty with the ROC. But the United States supports a robust unofficial relationship with the island and continues to sell defence equipment to its military. Beijing has repeatedly urged Washington to stop selling weapons to and cease contact with Taipei.

The U.S. approach is governed by its One China policy. It is based on several documents, such as three U.S.-China communiqués reached in 1972, 1978, and 1982; the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979; and the recently declassified “Six Assurances”, which President Ronald Reagan conveyed to Taiwan in 1982.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. China's conflict with India and
   - total casualties

China has for the first time revealed that four of its soldiers died during a bloody Himalayan border clash with Indian troops in June 2023. The men died after fighting "foreign troops" who "crossed into the Chinese border", said Chinese state media.

The combat had taken place in the Galwan Valley in India's Ladakh region, and soldiers had fought with stones and nail-studded clubs. It was the first deadly clash in the undecided border area in 45 years.

Previously India said that 20 of its soldiers were killed in last year's clash, while Beijing acknowledged casualties but did not show details.

China's military news outlet PLA Daily named the "heroic" Chinese soldiers who gave their "youth, blood and even life" to the region - Chen Hongjun, Chen Xiangrong, Xiao Siyuan and Wang Zhuoran. They were all given post-obit awards.

Wang had died after drowning in icy waters while crossing a river to reach his army mates, said the report.

Meanwhile, another man, regimental commander Qi Fabao, was also given honors after sustaining "serious injuries". India and China have been locked in a border dispute for decades. The root cause of the tension is an ill-defined, 3,440km (2,100-mile)-long disputed border called the Line of Actual Control.

Rivers, lakes, and snowcaps along the boundary mean the line can shift, bringing soldiers face to face at many points, sparking a confrontation. The two countries however have a long-standing agreement to not use guns or explosives along the border.

In January this year, the two armies also clashed along the border in the north-east in India's Sikkim state, leaving troops on both sides injured. But India and China have since agreed to "disengage" from the border are now pulling back troops from part of the border.

The hand-to-hand combat lasted hours, on steep, jagged terrain, with iron bars, rocks, and fists. Neither side carried guns. Most of the soldiers killed in the worst fighting between India and China in 60 years lost their footing or were knocked from the narrow Himalayan ridge, plunging to their deaths.

India has reacted with shock and caution to the loss of at least 20 soldiers on its disputed border with China, with images of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, burned in Indian cities.

In his first public comments on the dispute, prime minister Narendra Modi led a two-minute silence for the killed soldiers and said India would “defend every stone, every inch of its territory.”

“I would like to assure the nation that the sacrifice of our jawans will not be in vain,” said Modi, speaking at a televised meeting of India’s chief ministers. “For us, the unity and sovereignty of the country is the most important.”

A day after reports of the “violent face-off” in the western Himalayas appeared, Indian news outlets began naming some of the dead and a clearer picture started to build of what happened on the high, steep ridge lines above the fast-flowing Galwan River.

The December 2022 clash between Chinese and Indian troops along the two countries’ 2,100-mile-long contested border highlights a worrying “one step forward, two steps back” trend. Although these clashes are often followed by dialogue and other steps to reduce tensions, both sides have increasingly militarised their border policies and shown no sign of backing down. And the situation on the border stays tense, as Beijing and New Delhi are hardening their positions on either side of the LAC, with the potential for increase between the two nuclear-armed powers.

Tensions over the border dispute are a particular cause for concern given the overall trajectory of the Sino-Indian relationship, which has soured expressively in recent years. If Beijing and New Delhi are to resolve these long-standing disagreements, they have several challenges to face, many of which were only worsened by these recent clashes. These include militarisation of the border, India’s increasingly assertive foreign policy and growing threats to regional strategic stability.

After the Galwan incident, the two sides took part in 18 rounds of corps-commander level meetings that led to a limited taking away of forces and the creation of military buffer zones. Indeed, these talks helped limit unwanted escalation — a success that should not be ignored. But real disengagement has been nominal, with considerable numbers of forces staying near the border. The most recent round of talks led to no major innovations.

Despite repeated detachment agreements since 2020, both sides have deepened their relative footholds along the border, bringing in new combined-arms brigades and building added infrastructure. China has focused on building up infrastructure along the LAC. In 2021, China’s legislature passed a land borders law, which stipulates that the state shall “promote coordination between border defence and social, economic development in border areas.” In line with this directive, China has constructed significant civilian and military infrastructure near the border.

According to the Pentagon’s most recent China military power report, since the 2020 Galwan clash, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has “maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure buildup along the LAC.” This is validated by the latest satellite imagery of the border regions. Images from CSIS’s China Power, for example, show a division-level headquarters being developed at Pangong Lake, just south of the Gogra Hot Springs where troops cut off last fall.

Commercial satellite imagery also shows barracks and other new infrastructure in the Galwan Valley. These new sites point to an increasingly lasting Chinese military presence along the border.

In the meantime, the Indian military has undertaken its own military buildup along the border. In 2021, for example, New Delhi redirected approximately 50,000 troops to the LAC. The Indian Air Force also stays operationally positioned near the border.

This force increase is bolstered by infrastructure projects, such as plans to construct 73 strategic roads along the LAC, including 1,430 miles of road in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh — where the December 2022 clashes happened and which Beijing claims as “Southern Tibet” — alone, as well as several tunnels to ease quicker transportation to border regions. The Indian government also launched its “Vibrant Villages” campaign this year to build important infrastructure in villages on its side of the disputed border.

The hard reality is that both sides are militarising the border. In response to an obstinate and growing Chinese threat, India has begun rebalancing its army away from Pakistan to the LAC. As a result, we can expect a larger and more permanent presence from both Chinese and Indian forces in the year ahead. And these developments will only be a fresh barrier in the way of resolving these recurrent disputes.

Overall, New Delhi’s foreign policy in recent years has been geared more toward countering Beijing than engagement, and the border dispute has damaged increasingly fraught bilateral relations. Indeed, both India’s prime minister and foreign minister have said that peace at the border is a prerequisite for normalised relations.

After the Cold War, the Sino-Indian relationship warmed and included regular high-level engagement. Both countries aligned on several global issues, including desire for reform of the multilateral international order, and bilateral trade roared.

As a result, a common assumption in Indian foreign policy circles was that the boundary dispute could be kept separate from the political and economic relationship, eventually creating space to accommodate each other’s interests and stabilise the bilateral relationship.

But after the 2020 Galwan crisis these assumptions have been challenged. In the economic domain, New Delhi responded to Beijing’s border transgressions with increased scrutiny and sanctions of Chinese investments and firms. India also banned dozens of Chinese apps following the 2020 clash, including TikTok and WeChat.

Since then, more bans have been implemented, resulting in hundreds of Chinese apps being banned from the massive Indian market. At the same time, it has prioritised economic engagement with other partners to reduce its dependence on China, including recent free trade talks with the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative with Japan and Australia.

These changes to its economic engagement with China have also been bolstered by India’s deepening strategic relationship with Western democracies. For example, U.S.-India defence trade has grown from “near zero in 2008 to over 20 billion USD in 2020.”

Most recently, Washington and New Delhi launched the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies to expand their strategic technology partnership and industrial defence cooperation. The two militaries have also regularised several exercises, including Tiger Triumph, Yudh Abhyas, and exercise Malabar, which now bring together the navies of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, jointly known as the Quad.

As New Delhi has hardened on Beijing, it has deepened its relationship with the United States and other Indo-Pacific partners. This also comes at a time of growing economic challenges and mutual mistrust between India and China. Unavoidably, New Delhi’s new foreign policy direction will clash with Chinese interests and could likely lead to new challenges for managing the border disputes in 2023.

Amid tensions between China and India, Pakistan’s political and economic turmoil, and the revival of great power competition, strategic stability in Asia is getting harder to manage. The region is experiencing a cascading security dilemma where nuclear-armed states — China, India, and Pakistan — justify advancements to their own arsenals as a response to seeming threats from their adversaries. This dilemma heightens the risk that border disputes could cross the nuclear threshold.

At last year’s 20th National Party Congress, Chinese leader Xi Jinping said his country needed to build a strong “strategic deterrence system.” Xi’s remarks point to Beijing’s increasingly negative belief of the international environment. This new threat feeling, paired with Beijing’s expanding nuclear arsenal and investments in advanced delivery systems, may fuel New Delhi’s own nuclear build-up.

At the very least, it will increase the already high levels of mutual mistrust. While nuclear use stays unlikely, tensions along the border complicate this dangerous dilemma. Infrastructure development and military patrols along the LAC may spur new military investments, both conventional and nuclear. In turn, these investments will heighten tensions along the border.

 

Clashes along the LAC have become all too routine in recent years, and current trends in the Sino-Indian relationship offer little hope of improvement. Both sides appear to be digging-in near the border instead of undoing, and New Delhi’s foreign policy has evolved to become more assertive in criticising Beijing, while Beijing has become increasingly stubborn. Despite these tensions, there are still opportunities for Washington to help lower the temperature along the Sino-Indian border.

Washington can and should voice support for New Delhi, but it must do so in a way that does not worsen an already tense situation. Such a regulated response will include opposing unilateral attempts by either side to change the territorial status quo, as well as championing India’s own efforts toward de-escalation. This steady and confident support, especially during a crisis, will go a long way to building trust and credibility in the U.S.-India partnership.

Secondly, the United States can share valuable information and intelligence about Chinese movement in border regions, as well as equipment to support India’s own intelligence, surveillance, and exploration capabilities. The United States provided India with such support during the December 2022 border clash in Arunachal Pradesh. The intelligence allowed India to better prepare to confront the Chinese incursions.

Experience from this incident can be a model to build on for future collaboration. Materiel commitments can also be bolstered by joint intelligence reviews where analysts from both countries collaboratively discuss the PLA’s activities and intentions along the border. Such action from Washington would proactively and resolutely support New Delhi’s plight without fanning the flames of conflict or conflating the issue with ongoing tensions in its own relationship with China.

Unfortunately, business as usual is likely to define the contested border in 2023. Structural challenges to China-India relations are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon, leaving ample possibility for future clashes. Military talks between Beijing and New Delhi will almost certainly continue — and may very well prevent unnecessary escalation — but they are unlikely to reach terms for large-scale disengagement. And if an incident were to soar into a crisis, large numbers of nearby forces could also become entangled in a conflict. Such a shocking possibility should not be ignored.

The LAC is divided into three sections. The western section comprises Ladakh on the Indian side and Tibet and Xinjiang on the Chinese side. The middle section runs along the Indian states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh and, on the Chinese side, Tibet. Finally, the eastern part makes up Arunachal Pradesh – what China calls “South Tibet” – and Tibet. The first and last sections are the most contested, and where militarisation efforts have been intense.

In the western section, in Tibet, satellite images point to an increasingly proved Chinese presence. There the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has since 2017 ordered the construction of a wide network of military installations to support the deployment of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops. “Well-off villages” – Xiaokang – have been erected to resettle more than 250,000 Tibetans closer to the border to add permanence and reliability to Beijing’s territorial claims. The villages include dual-use infrastructure such as housing, roads, public service facilities – including supermarkets, schools, and police stations – as well as internet or 5G connectivity.

The villages form part of the CCP’s broader “Plan for the Construction of Well-off Villages in the Border Areas of the Tibet Autonomous Region,” which involves the construction of 628 villages in 112 Tibetan border towns. As of last year, the construction work of all villages has been completed. While the exact locations of the settlements are not known, India’s Foreign Ministry has suggested that one village in Arunachal Pradesh, in the LAC’s eastern section, lies 4.5 kilometres within India’s claimed territory.

The villages enable Beijing to assert territorial control, a reflection of the CCP’s civilian-military fusion policy. Tibetan herders are deployed alongside PLA and CCP security units as plainclothes security operatives. Together they form “border patrol teams” responsible for conducting monthly patrols.

The patrols – held multiple times a month and lasting from three to ten days – are intended to instruct PLA and CCP units on local conditions and routes. Chinese flags are also placed “at key spots when necessary to claim the territory,” reported China’s Global Times. Ongoing PLA recruitment drives in the villages further ensure a reserve of security personnel.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. North Korea's conflict with
   South Korea and Japan

South Korea-Japan relations overshadowed for over a century by historical grievances, political and trade disputes, now seem to have an opportunity to reset ties and to reconcile due to the existential threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea, which has been steadily increasing and upgrading its ballistic missile launch capabilities.

The disputes that had earlier been impediments are now slowly being resolved or being laid aside as Pyongyang unceasingly develops its weapons technology at a rapid pace with upgraded missiles that will be even harder to intercept.

It was reported that between the period from 25th September to 9th October 2022, the North Korean regime had test launched at least thirteen missiles. One of the launches on 3rd October 2022 was believed to be a Hwasong-12 IRBM (Inter-Mediate Range Ballistic Missile) fired from the Chagang province of North Korea. It flew over the Aomori area of Japan, covering a total distance of 4600 km before landing in the Pacific Ocean some 3200 km away from Japan.

The range covered by the Hwasong-12 IRBM has also raised significant concerns for the United States (US), as it proved North Korea’s capability to strike the US island of Guam from Pyongyang. North Korea has claimed that its missile launches were in protest of the increasing military exercises involving South Korea, Japan, and US, including a naval exercise involving the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier.

The trilateral anti-submarine warfare exercise in seas within the neighborhood of Korea and Japan was held for the first time in five years on 30th September 2022.

However, it is most likely that the recent missile test launches by North Korea were not a reprisal to the military exercises but a pre-planned simulation for “tactical nuclear operations.”

This ongoing USIP essays series looks to explore new and creative approaches for finding an enduring resolution to Japan-South Korea tensions. USIP’s Northeast Asia program invited subject matter experts to offer a fresh viewpoint on the challenge by either examining an innovative approach or a creative take on an existing approach. In particular, the goal was to examine ideas that could have hands-on policy value for policymakers.

North Korea criticized a joint military exercise by South Korea, Japan and the United States held this month, state media said that such drills show the relationship among three countries has developed into "the Asian version of NATO".

The three countries began large-scale joint military drills called "Freedom Edge" involving navy destroyers, fighter jets and the nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt, aimed at furthering defenses against missiles, submarines, and air attacks.

The exercise was devised at the three-way summit at Camp David last year to strengthen military cooperation amid tensions on the Korean peninsula stemming from North Korea's weapons testing.

Pyongyang will not ignore the strengthening of a military bloc led by the U.S. and its allies and will protect regional peace with an aggressive and overwhelming response, North Korea's foreign ministry said in a statement.

The meeting between South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in October — the first bilateral summit between South Korean and Japanese leaders in over a decade — was welcomed by both sides as a major step toward renewing relations. Despite ample common cause on issues such as regional security and economic growth, ties between the two countries have been strained in recent years over unsettled disputes stemming from Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea.

Yoon and Kishida are by no means the first leaders to try to rebuild the bilateral relationship, and past attempts have failed to provide the kind of long-term closure that would put the historical tensions to rest. But given the hostile give-and-take between the two countries in recent years, this month’s summit offers a sign of sorely needed reconciliation as the two U.S. allies seek to address an increasingly aggressive North Korea and China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific. USIP’s Frank Aum and Mirna Galic break down the latest agreement, the reaction from South Korean civil society, and what improved security cooperation between South Korea and Japan means for U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.

For decades, both countries have recognized the need to settle past historical issues from the Japanese colonial period and improve their diplomatic and economic ties in order to address common challenges.

However, past agreements meant to resolve their differences, such as the 1965 normalization treaty and claims agreement and the 2015 comfort women agreement, were often vague or paid insufficient attention to victims’ concerns for the sake of political convenience and national goals. These agreements allowed the two countries to improve relations suitably enough to achieve gains in security, development and prosperity. But because they didn’t resolve important questions about the colonial period, the agreements remained controversial — subject to different understandings and recurring risks of collapse.

For example, two 2018 South Korean Supreme Court decisions stated that Japanese companies must directly compensate Korean victims of forced labor — a ruling that challenged Japan’s interpretation of the colonial period and the 1965 claims agreement. The decision quickly strained bilateral relations, upset economic ties and threatened security cooperation between the two countries.

The latest agreement by the Yoon and Kishida governments may be following the same unsuccessful pattern. With both countries facing similar challenges in recent years — including Chinese coercion, North Korean hostility, weak economic growth, inflationary pressure, supply chain elasticity and climate change — there is significant incentive for the two to work together. 

The recent bilateral deal tries to mend relations and restore cooperation by compensating South Korean forced labor victims through a foundation made up of funds from South Korean companies, rather than Japanese ones. This is meant to ease tensions over the 2018 South Korean Supreme Court cases and allow Japan to support its argument that the 1965 treaty and therefore Japanese companies had settled all claims do not need to recompense.

The deal, at least at the governmental level, appears to be working: It facilitated President Yoon’s visit to Tokyo last week — the first bilateral summit between the two countries’ leaders in 12 years — where they agreed to resume mutual diplomatic visits and security dialogues, normalise an intelligence-sharing agreement, and take steps toward resolving ongoing trade disputes.

Japan also lifted export controls on South Korea related to three chemicals necessary for its high-tech industries. And business federations in both countries announced that they would contribute funds to support youth scholarships and cultural exchanges.

While the agreement might be working for the Yoon government, multiple polls also show that about 60 percent of the South Korean public opposes the agreement, suggesting that it may not provide the closure that both governments are seeking.

The Yoon government may have determined that the agreement, while disappointing for the forced labor victims, was the best deal possible given Japan’s refusal to accept their claims. But at least three of the 15 forced labor victims who have pending legal cases against Japanese companies have refused to accept any money that does not come from these companies directly. They have also brought a new suit to collect money from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, one of the Japanese companies involved.

And while Japanese Prime Minister Kishida reaffirmed the 1998 declaration in which Japan expressed repentance for its colonial rule, critics have complained that the Japanese side did not provide a sincere apology. One victim, Kim Seong-joo said, “We can forgive, if Japan tells us one word, we are sorry and we did wrong. But there is no such word.” Claims by Japanese politicians that Japan is “a victim caught up in the [lawsuit]” or that the deal was a “total victory for Japan” because “we didn’t have to concede anything” have only rankled South Korean critics further.

The agreement’s incapability to address the victims’ concerns raises legal issues that may cause it to fall apart, like previous efforts. By law, the claimants must consent to having a third-party satisfy a debt for the deal to continue. If the victims do not consent, then it is unclear how the South Korean Supreme Court will resolve the pending cases that, based on earlier rulings, might allow for the seizure and bankruptcy of Japanese company assets.

Any court decision that delays or obstructs a favourable ruling for the victims based on the political agreement might raise concerns about judicial freedom, but a decision by the relevant Japanese companies to voluntarily contribute funds to the foundation may help coax the victims to accept the funds.

Reviving security ties between their countries was reportedly on the agenda for Yoon and Kishida during their meetings in Tokyo. This includes intelligence sharing, the recommencement of bilateral security dialogues suspended since 2018, and, potentially, the establishment of an information-sharing framework on North Korean ballistic missile launches. All of these activities would most benefit Japan and South Korea themselves, but the United States will gain from any increased security ties between its two allies as well.

Intelligence and information sharing between Japan and South Korea would increase dissuasion against North Korea — something of direct interest to the United States — especially since Japan has enhanced its domestic ability to respond to attacks. Increased bilateral military cooperation between Japan and South Korea could also lead to increased trilateral military cooperation between these countries and the United States.

More broadly, the entire U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy rests on working in concert with allies and associates in the region. It is easier to align our approach to strengthening Indo-Pacific security and advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific — two of the goals of the administration’s strategy — if our partners in the region are also able to work more closely together on such issues. The message that this sends about ally unity and the ability of the United States and its associates in the region to overcome difficulties for the sake of shared priorities is also important.

So, Yoon and Kishida’s efforts to mend ties between their countries are seen as a plus from the viewpoint of the U.S. government, which has been steadily encouraging the two sides and strongly welcomed the leaders’ initiative.

Not so much North Korea. The North Korean regime registered its disapproval by launching an intercontinental ballistic missile on the first day of the summit. Certainly, North Korea would prefer for Japan and South Korea to be divided and less able to coordinate than united and cooperating. China’s official response, meanwhile, has been muted, which makes sense: It would be difficult for Beijing — which is intent on representing itself as a global peacemaker — to publicly criticise two neighbouring countries for trying to improve their bilateral relations.

Bringing Japan and South Korea closer together has long been a priority for the Biden administration, which included the goal in its Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States no doubt encouraged the leaders to meet behind the scenes and U.S. shuttle diplomacy between the two countries has been credited with helping to bring about the summit.

The United States also issued Yoon an invitation for a coveted state visit after the summit was announced, to bolster his domestic standing. Continued U.S. positive strengthening and support of this kind for both Japan and South Korea will be important as the countries navigate the complicated issues that underpin tensions between them. What is difficult is that although the United States can express support for and influence the efforts of the two governments, it does not have sway over the views of the Japanese and Korean publics, including the Korean victims' groups, which need to support their governments’ initiatives.

All U.S. administrations, including the current one, have strongly supported Japan-South Korea reconciliation that eases future-oriented cooperation on diplomatic, security and economic matters.

This recent agreement is no exception. However, if the three countries want a lasting, final resolution to the historical issues that both minimises the potential for periodic eruptions of strained relations and maximises the potential for optimal bilateral cooperation — perhaps even a bilateral South Korea-Japan alliance — then they should pursue measures that give the victims appropriate closure and compensation, reconcile competing views of history as much as possible, and provide proper remembrance and education for future generations.

Earlier this month, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida made the surprise declaration that he would not seek another term. Although he was prime minister for less than four years, Kishida’s foreign policy legacy spans strategic and tactical advances in Japan’s defence and diplomatic posture.

His approach represented both a continuation of and divergence from the legacy of his former boss, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, under whom Kishida acted as Japan’s longest-serving foreign minister. Although Kishida’s successes on foreign affairs were outshined by domestic political scandals involving his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as well as lack-lustre economic growth, he oversaw increases in Japan’s reputation and popularity in the region and globally, as well as the institutionalisation of related partnership gains.

As the Cold War came to dominate U.S. foreign policy, America extended security commitments to two nations in Northeast Asia—the Republic of Korea and Japan. The Department of State under Secretary Dean Acheson forged a series of agreements to build a permanent American presence in the region and support these two nations, creating alliances that have lasted to today.

After Japan’s absolute surrender to the Allied Powers in August 1945, the United States military occupied the defeated nation and began a series of far-reaching reforms designed to build a peaceful and democratic Japan by reducing the power of the military and breaking up the largest Japanese business conglomerates.

However, growing concern over Communist power in East Asia, particularly the success of the Chinese Communist Party in its struggle against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces, led the United States to halt reforms in 1947 and 1948 to focus on the economic recovery and political restoration of Japan. In this “Reverse Course,” Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, focused on strengthening, not demanding, what would become a key cold war ally.

 

1. Indo-Pak terrorism in
   J & K - total casualties

As per the Indian Army data quoted by Reuters, at least 70 young Kashmiris joined the insurgency in 2014, with most joining the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba, which handled carrying out the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Two of the new recruits have doctorates and eight were postgraduates, the army data showed. According to BBC, despite a Pakistani ban on militant activity in Kashmir in 2006, its militants continue to try infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir. These attempts were truncated however when people living along the Line of Control which divides Indian and Pakistani Kashmir started to hold public protests against the activities of the insurgent groups.

In 2016, violence erupted in the aftermath of the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen militant Burhan Wani by security forces. Since then, militants belonging to the Jaish-e-Mohammed group carried out the 2016 Uri attack and the 2018 Sunjuwan attack. In February 2019, the Pulwama attack occurred, in which 40 CRPF personnel were killed by a Jaish-e-Mohammed suicide bomber.

In August 2019, the special status of Jammu and Kashmir was revoked, following which the Indian Army intensified its counter-insurgency operations. In June 2020, Doda district was declared militancy free while Tral was declared free from Hizbul Mujahideen militants. In July, a Kashmir police tweet from an official twitter handle said, "no resident of Srinagar district in terrorist ranks now".

On 27 June 2021, a day after the successful completion of discussions between the Indian Prime Minister and Jammu and Kashmir political leaders, a drone-based attack was reported at the technical area of Jammu Airport which is under the control of the IAF.

In the first three months of 2022, there was a 100% increase in the number of Indian soldiers killed by Kashmiri militants compared to the same period in 2021.

A total of 28 people, including civilians and security personnel, were killed in 11 terror-initiated incidents and 24 encounters or counter-terror operations up to July 21 this year, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) told the Lok Sabha.

Responding to the query of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) MP Pradeep Kumar Singh on behalf of the MHA, Union Minister of State for Home Nityanand Rai sent a written reply in the Lower House pointing that there is a "decline in the number of terror incidents in Jammu and Kashmir" compared to previous years.

Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir has claimed a total of 41,000 lives in the past 27 years which means an average of four deaths per day in the state or 1519 casualties every year, according to the latest available government data.

The casualties include 14,000 civilians, 5,000 security personnel and 22,000 militants between 1990 and March 2017. In all, there have been 69,820 militancy-related occurrences during the period; that is like the state witnessing 2586 militancy incidents every year, for which India blames cross border terror from Pakistan.

The February 26 Indian airstrike on a terrorist reserve in Pakistan’s heartland cannot obscure the resurfacing of India-China tensions following the Valentine’s Day terrorist attack in Pulwama that killed dozens of Indian paramilitary troops.

China’s blame in the attack — and in earlier lethal cross-border terrorist strikes, such as on the Pathankot airbase — is plain from its shielding of Pakistan’s export of terrorism to India. China blatantly provides cover for Pakistan’s collusion with state-reared terrorists.

The message from India’s use of airpower for the first time against a cross-border terrorist haven is that it is not afraid to escalate its response to the aerial domain to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. This could possibly mark a defining moment in India’s counterterrorism efforts against Pakistan’s strategy to inflict death by a thousand cuts.

 

The airstrike, however, is likely to reinforce Beijing’s resolve to bolster Pakistan as a counterweight to India, especially because China incurs no strategic or trade costs for holding India. Beijing is not only propping up the Pakistani state financially and militarily, but also has repeatedly blocked United Nations action against the chief of the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorist group, which was quick to claim responsibility for the Pulwama carnage.

The paradox is that China, the world’s longest-surviving autocracy, has locked up more than a million Muslims from Xinjiang in the name of cleansing their minds of extremist thoughts, yet is simultaneously shielding Pakistan’s export of deadly Islamist terrorism to India. While Pakistan employs terrorist groups as proxies to bleed India, China uses Pakistan as a proxy to box in India.

The plain fact is that, for China, Pakistan is not just a client state, but a valued instrument to help hold India. So, is it any surprise that since the April 2018 Wuhan summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing has stepped up its use of Pakistan as an India-containment tool, including by hastening the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and playing the Kashmir card against New Delhi?

In fact, China is gradually encircling India, as several developments underscore — from its new military base in Tajikistan that overlooks the Wakhan Corridor and Pakistan-held Jammu and Kashmir to its increasing encroachments in India’s naval backyard.

It is extraordinary that China has been able to mount pressure on India from multiple flanks at a time when its own economic and geopolitical fortunes are taking a beating. By China’s own statistics, its economy last year registered the weakest pace of growth in three decades. Add to the picture a new phenomenon — the flight of capital from a country that, between 1994 and 2014, amassed a mounting pile of foreign-exchange reserves by enjoying a surplus in its overall balance of payments.

Now faced with an overwhelming trend of net capital outflows, Xi’s regime has tightened exchange controls and other capital restrictions to prop up the country’s fragile financial system and drooping currency. The regime has used tens of billions of dollars in recent months alone to bolster the yuan’s international value. Not just capital is fleeing China, but even wealthy Chinese prefer to live overseas, in a vote of no confidence in the Chinese system.

New external factors are compounding China’s internal challenges. Chinese aggression and propaganda, for example, have spawned a growing international image problem for the country. More significantly, China has come under international pressure on several fronts — from its trade, investment, and lending policies to its human-rights abuses.

U.S.-led pressure on trade and geopolitical fronts has emphasized Beijing’s dilemmas and fuelled uncertainty in China. If the U.S.-China trade war rages, flight of capital will remain a problem for Beijing. Its foreign-exchange reserves have shrunk by about $1 trillion from their peak of just over $4 trillion in mid-2014.

At a time when China’s imperial project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is running into resistance from a growing number of partner countries, Beijing is also confronting a U.S.-led pushback against its telecommunications giant Huawei. Meanwhile, China is alienating other Asian nations by throwing its weight around too belligerently.

This trend is likely to accelerate with the restructured People’s Liberation Army becoming less of an army and more of a power projection force, many of whose troops now are not from the army but from the other services. Indeed, the PLA’s shift toward power projection presages a more aggressive Chinese military approach of the kind already seen in the Himalayas or the South China Sea, where China has essentially changed the status quo in its favour.

More fundamentally, it is China’s open disrespect of international rules and its penchant for bullying that explains why it stays a friendless power. Leadership in today’s world demands more than just physical might. Beijing lacks any strategic allies other than Pakistan. When China joined hands with the U.S. at the United Nations to impose new international sanctions on North Korea, once its vassal, it implicitly emphasized that it now has just one real ally — Pakistan.

China today is increasingly oriented to the primacy of the Communist Party, responsible for the past witch-hunts and the current excesses. Under Xi, the party has set out to annihilate Muslim, Tibetan, and Mongol identities, expand China’s frontiers far out into international waters, and turn the country into a digital totalitarian state. Subsequently, four decades after it started economic reform, China finds itself at crossroads, with its future course uncertain.

It is against this background that the Xi regime’s increasing use of Pakistan against India stands out. China is working to extend its reach to the Arabian Sea by turning Pakistan into a client-state and keeping India off-balance.

Beijing not only continues to bolster Pakistan’s offensive capabilities, including in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also is working in tandem with that country to militarise the northern Arabian Sea. Chinese-supplied warships have already been pressed into service to secure Pakistan’s Chinese-controlled Gwadar port, the flagship project in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which, in turn, is the centrepiece of BRI.

Through CPEC, China is looking to turn Pakistan into its land corridor to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. And, as a U.S. Defence Department report in 2016 cautioned, Pakistan — “China’s primary customer for conventional weapons” — is likely to host a Chinese naval hub intended to project power in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Such a naval base is expected to come up quietly next to the Gwadar port, directly challenging India’s naval interests.

China, meanwhile, has actively aided Pakistan’s counterstrategy to the Indian military’s supposed “Cold Start” policy. Pakistan’s counter is a mobile WMD capability centred on tactical nuclear weapons for use against enemy battle formations. The “Cold Start” doctrine is the idea of a quick and limited Indian conservative strike in response to a Pakistan-scripted terrorist attack, to deny Pakistani generals the ability to raise conflict to a nuclear level.

That doctrine is still speculative, with no indication that India has either integrated it into its military strategy or reconfigured force deployments to execute it in an exigency. Yet Pakistan, with Chinese support, has fielded tactical nukes, creating a dangerous situation. Let us be clear: Pakistan’s irresponsibility has been egged on by China. A full-fledged war on the subcontinent will open opportunities for China against India that Beijing looks for.

Beijing has repeatedly declared that China and Pakistan are “as close as lips and teeth.” It has also called Pakistan its “irreplaceable all-weather friend.” The two countries often boast of their “iron brotherhood.” In 2010, Pakistan’s then-prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, was poetic about the relationship, describing it as “taller than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey.”

In truth, China has little in common with aid-dependent Pakistan other than a shared enmity against India. China and Pakistan are revisionist states not content with their existing frontiers. Both lay claim to vast swaths of Indian territory. Their “iron brotherhood” is about a shared interest in having India. The prospect of a two-front war, should India enter conflict with either Pakistan or China, certainly advances that interest.

India will never be able to break the China-Pakistan nexus, however hard it might try. Yet consecutive Indian governments have failed to grasp this strategic reality. Every Indian prime minister has looked to reinvent the foreign-policy wheel rather than learn the essentials of statecraft or heed the lessons of past mistakes.

In fact, an economically rising India looking to chart an independent course only gives Beijing a greater incentive to use Pakistan as a replacement against it. For China, the appeal of propping up Pakistan is heightened by the latter’s willingness to serve as a loyal proxy. In fact, given that Pakistan is an economic basket case dependent on Chinese lending, Beijing treats it as something of a guinea pig. For example, it has sold Pakistan outdated or untested nuclear power reactors (two such AC-1000 reactors are coming up near Karachi). China has also sold weapons systems not deployed by its own military.

Less known is that Pakistan’s descent into a jihadist dungeon has helped China, as it has provided an ideal pretext for Beijing to advance its strategic interests within that country. For example, China has positioned thousands of troops in Pakistan-held Jammu and Kashmir since the last decade, to secure its strategic projects.

The Chinese military presence there means that India faces Chinese troops on both flanks of its part of Jammu and Kashmir, given that China occupies one-fifth of the original princely state of J&K. This presence also explains why India faces a two-front scenario in case of a war with either country.

More fundamentally, Beijing has pursued a troubling three-pronged policy to build pressure on New Delhi over J&K, where the disputed borders of India, Pakistan and China converge. First, it has enlarged its footprint in Pakistan-occupied J&K through CPEC projects, despite Indian protestations that such projects in a territory India claims as its own violate Indian sovereignty.

Second, Beijing has tried to question India’s sovereignty over Indian J&K by issuing visas on a separate leaf to J&K residents holding Indian passports. And third, it has officially shortened the length of the Himalayan border it shares with India by purging the 1,597-kilometer line separating Indian J&K from Chinese-held J&K.

Add to the picture China’s shielding of Pakistan’s export of terrorism and its indirect encouragement of separatism in India’s J&K. Then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh cautioned in 2010 that “Beijing could be tempted to use India’s ‘soft underbelly,’ Kashmir.”

While building projects in Pakistan-occupied J&K, an UN-designated disputed territory, China denied a visa in 2010 to the Indian Army’s Northern Command General B.S. Jaswal, who was to lead the Indian side in the bilateral defence dialogue in Beijing, on grounds that he commanded “a disputed area, Jammu and Kashmir.”At the same time, Beijing has signalled an interest in cleverly inserting itself as a mediator in the India-Pakistan tensions over Kashmir. This is part of China’s efforts to obscure the fact that it is the third party to the J&K dispute.

While playing the Kashmir card against India, China offers Pakistan security assurances and political protection, especially diplomatic cover at the United Nations.

For example, China has repeatedly vetoed UN action against Masood Azhar, the Pakistan-based chief of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, which, backed by Pakistani intelligence services, has carried out several major terrorist attacks on Indian targets, including the Pathankot air base in 2016 and the Parliament in 2001. And in 2016, Sartaj Aziz, the then Pakistani prime minister’s foreign-policy adviser, said that China has helped Pakistan to block India’s U.S.-supported bid to gain membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the export-control cartel.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Race of weapons and
   its effects on the Earth
   
   

After Germany yielded at the end of the Second World War, the leaders of the allied nations met at the Potsdam Conference to discuss the future shape of world politics. At the conference, US President Truman—who was new to the job and a little overwhelmed by the larger-than-life figures of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin—wanted to look strong. He boasted to Stalin that his government had a secret powerful new weapon.

A few months later, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided a real-world demonstration of this destructive power. Truman had failed to consult his Soviet partners before he used the bombs against Japanese civilians.

As a result, Stalin assumed the Americans wanted to coerce the USSR. He was so alarmed that he directed all available funds toward building a Soviet bomb. In 1949, after the first successful Soviet nuclear test, Stalin reflected that, “atomic weapons can hardly be used without spelling the end of the world.” Nonetheless, he believed that the weapons were the Soviet Union’s only defense against an American bomb.

Leaders of the national security establishments throughout the world are remarkably resistant to outside pressures. The borders, rallies, and demonstrations attracting millions of participants; many writings in medical and academic journals; and many conferences have had no significant impact on the nuclear arms race.

There are reasons for the futility of such activities. The most important is the rapid formation of vast technological, scientific, economic, bureaucratic, and military communities behind every new weapon system. Often the only decision involving a new weapon system is the first one. Once a bureaucratic unit has been set up and money has been distributed, the process unrolls automatically from research to testing and then to development and deployment.

In an anarchic world the final means of controlling the behavior of an enemy has been the threat or actual use of violence. Efforts to resolve international conflicts by cooperation have always been conducted in this context. The creditability of the threat of violence depended on the ability to support the tightest control possible over the course of battle should talks break down.

Control was looked for through battle plans based mainly on experience with earlier wars. Even when based on extensive earlier experience, these plans have often failed to work under battle settings. Scenarios for waging limited or controlled nuclear war are based only on extrapolations from Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the results of underground tests.

Most of the creators of these scenarios have never been in combat or even seen a nuclear explosion, and none, of course, has experienced a nuclear holocaust. To quote a high-ranking military expert: "In a very literal use of the language, they do not know what they are talking about" (T. L. Davies, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, personal communication, 1982). If battle plans based on wide experience so often failed under conditions of actual combat, what are the chances of success for these computerized nuclear fantasies?

The assimilation of nuclear weapons to conservative ones is abetted by the misuse of language. Words used to describe arms races and nuclear weapons are still exclusively those used for conservative weapons.

Concepts such as superiority, inferiority, defense, margin of safety, and so on, direct the language of military affairs. As semanticists have pointed out, in the absence of actual experience, reality is what we tell ourselves it is, so if we use the wrong words to describe a situation, we are off on the wrong foot before we even know we have started to think (Rapoport, 1984).

With the Industrial Revolution came new weaponry, including vastly improved warships. In the late nineteenth century, France and Russia built powerful armies and challenged the spread of British colonialism. In response, Great Britain shored up its Royal Navy to control the seas.

 

Britain managed to work out its arms race with France and Russia with two separate treaties. But Germany had also radically increased its military budget and might, building a large navy to contest Britain’s naval dominance in hopes of becoming a world power.

Though the United States and the Soviet Union were tentative allies during World War II, their alliance soured after Nazi Germany surrendered in May 1945.

The United States cast a wary eye over the Soviet Union’s quest for world dominance as they expanded their power and influence over Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union resented the United States’ geopolitical intrusion and America’s own arms buildup.

Further fueling the flame of distrust, the United States did not tell the Soviet Union they planned to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, although the United States informed them, they had created such a bomb.

To help discourage Soviet communist expansion, the United States built more atomic weaponry. But in 1949, the Soviets tested their own atomic bomb, and the Cold War nuclear arms race was on.

The United States responded in 1952 by testing the highly destructive hydrogen “super bomb,” and the Soviet Union followed suit in 1953. Four years later, both countries tested their first intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the arms race rose to a terrifying new level.

As you read about the history of humans, you see very early on that humans are naturally “tool users.” More explicitly, humans used tools as a means of subsistence and survival. Even today humans use tools to extend their capabilities beyond imagination. Axes and knife-like tools made from stone and flint could be used to pound or hammer or cut.

The earliest humans were hunter-gatherers and for survival had to capture or kill “an evening meal.” Spears, bows, and arrows became tools for hunting to kill larger prey for food and subsistence. However primitive, these early weapons would soon be used against other humans to defend territorial domains, to defend against other warring groups, or for protection against large predator animals.

The “inconvenient truth” we must face as a society is that weapons are necessary as we defend our country from foreign as well as domestic enemies. Whether it is a catastrophic event such as 9/11, a shooting on a college campus, or our commitments to help our allies overseas during wartime, our military and police need weapons to defend against these opponents.

However, we can also note that weapons are used for recreation as well—in hunting and shooting competitions for example. Given the enormous number of weapons used for protection or recreation, can we expect that conventional weapons are harmful to the environment? Unquestionably, in many ways, and have been since the Greeks used sulfur mixtures to produce suffocating fumes in the Trojan War (431BC).

Conventional artillery may be effectively harmful to our enemies, but pollution from these weapons is severely impacting the environment as well. Some of these weapons include chemical, biological, depleted uranium, landmines, nuclear, jet fighters, and even the conventional lead bullets fired from rifles and handguns.

“It is estimated that the Pentagon generates five times more toxins than the five major U.S. chemical companies combined” (Hay-Edie, 2002). The U.S. military is the “largest single source” of environmental pollution in the United States. It is estimated that the cost to clean up military-related sites costs approximately $500 billion dollars (Hay-Edie, 2002).

Chemical weapons:

Although the disposal of chemical weapons in the ocean ended in 1970, there is still concern about the potential hazards they may have on human health and safety as well as ocean life (Bearden, 2007). Following World Wars I and II ,  the most effective and efficient way to dispose of chemical weapons was to dump them in the ocean. Between 1945 and 1970, our oceans became the dumping grounds for chemical weapons — some of which were known to be leaking and posing immediate risk to those handling the weapons. The U.S. contributed 93,995 tons, France 9,250 tons, Britain 122,508 tons, and Russia 70,500 tons to the ocean floor.

The United States has also dumped approximately 100,000 tons in the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of New Jersey, California, Florida, South Carolina, India, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Japan, and Australia (Harigel, 2001). Specific locations of dumping are not known, making it difficult to ascertain exactly who is at risk. While some of these weapons are water soluble, others are not and can remain active for many years. Others are denser than seawater and may remain on the floor of the ocean, where they pose a greater threat. In addition, colder temperatures prevent the degradation of the chemicals (Bearden, 2007).

Ocean currents can carry contamination far beyond the original site where chemicals were dumped. In the Baltic Sea, fishermen have reported catching “encrusted sulphur mustard” in fishing nets while trawling, posing threats to sea life as well as humans (Bearden, 2007). As these weapons continue to deteriorate, they threaten our seas and the ocean life, extending threats to humans and the atmosphere around them.

Biological weapons:

Biological weapons are categorized into three basic types: spore-forming bacteria; vegetative bacteria (nonspore-forming); and viruses (Stuart, 2005). Studies have indicated that survival of these agents increases in air, water, textiles, and in soil (Stuart, 2005). Biological weapons may be more harmful than chemical weapons simply due to the fact that their effects on the environment cannot be reversed.

They spread disease and infections that cannot be detected immediately and lie in the environment around us for years, continuing to infect humans and the environment. In addition, it is very difficult to predict the impact of these weapons since viability depends on physiological factors in both the agent and the host at the time of pollution. Hence, sampling will result in more actual, accurate data instead of predicting what the hazards may be to the environment (Stuart, 2005). In addition to wartime weapon development, these agents have been developed to control illegal crops (i.e. poppy fields in Afghanistan and the coca plant in Columbia).

However, biological weapons also spread disease and destroy the atmosphere around them; they are just as much a threat to humans as they are to ecosystems and wildlife. Biological weapons applied on a large scale can wipe out entire populations quickly and without forewarning. Sometimes the effects are not known for months or perhaps even years. This, in particular, makes forecasting their impact very difficult.

Depleted uranium:

Used during the Gulf War (approximately 600,000 lbs.), depleted uranium (DU) has a life of 4.5 billion years, making this a long-term problem. In Afghanistan, there is evidence that DU ammunition has been used, causing contamination to the environment and “long-term health hazards” (Hay-Edie, 2002).

It is the by-product of the extraction process after natural uranium and extract-enriched uranium are combined for nuclear fuel and weapons (Pesic, 2005). DU is delivered with conventional weapons (i.e., tank rounds, machine guns, Gatling guns, artillery, and even sniper rifles) and significantly increases the “lethal range” of these conventional weapons (Pesic, 2005). Upon impact, DU converts to radioactive dust, which is easily ingested.

The World Health Organization has suggested that children are the most vulnerable to DU due to the fact that “typical hand-to-mouth activity in inquisitive play could lead to high DU ingestion from contaminated soil” (N.A., N.D.). Biological effects of ingestion are both radiological and chemical and may include kidney failure and cancers related to the immune system, blood, and/or bone (Pesic, 2005).

Land mines:

A passionate cause of the late Princess Diana of Great Britain was to highlight the fact that landmines pollute the world. Sixty to 110 million landmines cover the ground around the world, including hundreds of thousands littering the fields and mountains of Afghanistan (Hay-Edie, 2002). Annually, landmines are responsible for over 26,000 deaths across the globe, not including wild and domesticated animals.

They account for other issues related to deforestation, soil erosion, and water pollution as well. These mines account for not only physical and emotional injury in humans and animals, but also leave farmlands rendered useless, creating severe shortages of food and thus causing malnutrition in some areas of the world.

Nuclear weapons:

The danger of nuclear weapons is astounding. A global nuclear war has the potential to kill more than three billion people—half of the world’s population. The additional radiation that would remain in the air, soil, and water would affect the surviving population.

Nuclear weapons would wipe out land and water supplies, rendering the world without the ability to grow food and resulting in starvation in much of the population. Life would literally cease to exist on earth.

Nearly seventy years ago, in the midst of World War II, a decision was made to explore and develop a nuclear weapon that would eventually become the world’s most powerful weapon. It was feared that Adolf Hitler’s Germany would develop a similar weapon first.

Subsequently would begin what is now known as the “nuclear age.” The Manhattan Project brought together engineers, scientists, and technicians from around the United States to develop an atomic weapon of such scale that it would bring a close to a global war.

It is important to note that nuclear science was in its infancy at this time, and little was known about the health effects of radiation and nuclear materials on humans. The construction of the world’s first atomic bomb began at the Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico under the direction of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Jet fighters:

Jet fuel used to power jet fighters is as toxic to the environment as any other weapon. Jet fuel pollutes the air, soil, and water around us. Many times, the military has been known to “dump” fuel from jets in bodies of water as well as over unpopulated land areas. A typical jet fighter burns 105 liters (or 27.74 U.S. gallons) of jet fuel per minute (1,664.40 gallons per hour), while a C-17 cargo jet burns 11,350 liters per hour (or 2,998.35 U.S. gallons) (Biello, 2011).

To put this in perspective, one typical U.S. car burns 0.8 gallons per hour if running idle. Given this tremendous amount of fuel that is burned by military jets, we can imagine the impact emissions and dumping of fuel has on our environment. However, the military has announced that it is reducing its carbon footprint in several ways.

First, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus announced in 2009 that the Navy would be building the “Green Hornet,” a biofuel-powered F/A-18 jet fighter ready for flight in three years. This initiative is expected to save approximately 127,000 barrels of fuel per year and provide for a much cleaner-burning fuel source to help the war on pollution (Tirella, 2009). In addition, the military is also expected to convert its entire fleet of 50,000 vehicles to electric and hybrids by the year 2015 (Tirella, 2009).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Chances of World War III

 

On November 3, 2024, Dmitry Medvedev, a senior Russian security official who served as Russia's president from 2008 to 2012, warned the United States on Saturday to take Russia's nuclear warnings seriously to avoid World War III.

The 2-1/2-year-old war in Ukraine is entering what Russian officials say is its most dangerous phase as Russian forces are advancing in eastern Ukraine and the West considers how to shore up Ukraine. Russia has been signalling for weeks to the West that Moscow will respond if the United States and its allies help Ukraine fire longer-range missiles deep into Russia, while NATO says that North Korea has sent troops to western Russia.

Russian officials say the leaders of the West have failed to heed the signals Moscow has sent over European security and the escalation of the war in Ukraine. US diplomats say the relationship with Russia is worse than at any time since the depths of the Cold War but that Washington does not seek to escalate the war in Ukraine.

The US must increase defence spending to Cold War levels if it is to deal with the growing threat posed by China, Iran, Russia and North Korea, the latest Commission on the National Defence Strategy report has warned.

The chair of the bipartisan group, former Congress leader Jane Harman, said the US was facing the "most serious and most challenging" threats since the end of the Second World War, including a real risk of "near-term major war".

China's hostility towards Taiwan, Iran's nuclear ambitions and Russia's invasion of Ukraine all mean the world has never "been closer to World War III than we are now", Donald Trump said earlier this month.

The situation tells of a "tragic and terrifying tale of global failure on the part of the US and its allies", reported the Wall Street Journal, as China, Russia and Iran step up their attacks "on what remains of the Pax Americana and continue to make gains at the expense of Washington and its allies around the world".

With Israel's invasion of Gaza approaching its one-year anniversary, tensions in the Middle East now appear close to spilling over into Lebanon, following a series of increasingly deadly exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah.

So serious were the exchanges of fire this weekend, "it is hard to be sure that the two sides have not already crossed the threshold of 'all-out' war", said The Guardian.

The latest reciprocal wave of strikes was sparked by the extraordinary plot to blow up pagers and then walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah, killing 42 and wounding more than 3,000, an attack for which Israel is widely believed to have been responsible.

While Hezbollah is being "goaded" into an all-out conflict with Israel, Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, wrote on The Conversation, this would be "devastating" for both sides, said The Guardian, certainly drawing Iran into direct conflict with Israel.

Iran is Hezbollah's key backer and any conflict between Lebanon and Israel would set off a chain reaction along the "complex web of alliances and rivalries" across the Middle East, said The Independent. Any direct conflicts between Iran and Israel could then see the US brought directly into the fighting.

The US and UK are "increasingly concerned" that Russia is sharing secret information and technology with Iran which could "bring it closer to being able to build nuclear weapons, in exchange for Tehran providing Moscow with ballistic missiles for its war in Ukraine", Bloomberg reported.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered the "worst crisis in Russia's relations with the West since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis", said the Daily Mail. "Even talk of a confrontation between Russia and Nato – a Cold War nightmare of leaders and populations alike – indicates the dangers of escalation as the West grapples with a resurgent Russia, 32 years after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union."

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned that failure to fend off Russia's aggression could spiral into confrontation with Nato. "And that certainly means the Third World War," he has said.

Ukraine's surprise intrusion into Russia in August sparked renewed optimism among Kyiv's allies but also fear that it could force Vladimir Putin to escalate the war elsewhere, and by more extreme means, to regain the initiative and save face back home.

Instead, Russian troops continue to make slow but steady gains in eastern Ukraine. As a result, The Washington Post warned Ukraine is at risk of "bleeding out". It "doesn't have enough soldiers to fight an indefinite war of attrition" and "needs to escalate to be strong enough to reach a decent settlement".

Ukraine is pushing to be allowed to use Western weapons to attack Russian territory, a move that risks direct confrontation between Russia and Nato which would, in the words of Putin earlier this year, be "one step away from a full-scale World War Three".

If Putin ultimately prevails in Ukraine, he will "almost certainly try his luck" in the Baltics, said Dominic Waghorn, Sky News' international affairs editor – "because he will assume the alliance is too spineless to stop him". That view would be strengthened if Donald Trump were to carry through with his threats to pull America out of Nato if he wins the US presidential election in November.

Meanwhile, Moscow's "conventional and hybrid threats to US allies in Europe are intensifying by the day", said Dr Samuel Ramani in The Telegraph, and the danger of an "accidental conflict" in the lead-up to the US elections or their aftermath risks the "very worst" scenario: a "new world war".

It has long been assumed that the greatest threat to geopolitical stability is the growing tension between China and the US in recent years, most notably over Taiwan and the question of its sovereignty.

Beijing sees the island nation as an integral part of a unified Chinese territory. It has, in recent years, adopted an increasingly aggressive stance towards the island and its ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which it has condemned as dangerous separatists, but who won an unprecedented third term earlier this year. At the same time, the US has ramped up its support – financially, militarily, and rhetorically – for Taiwan's continued independence.

Earlier this year, the top US military commander in the Indo-Pacific said that Beijing is maintaining its goal of being able to invade Taiwan by 2027. Admiral John Aquilino told the US House Armed Services Committee that China wants to build up its People's Liberation Army (PLA) "on a scale not seen" since the Second World War.

The year 2027 is seen as "magical" because it marks the centenary of what was to become the PLA, said Robert Fox in the London Evening Standard. The idea that this anniversary could coincide with a serious military operation by Beijing has become a "fixation" in Washington, said Defense News. It has "impacted the debate over China policy – a shift from the long term to the short term" while also helping to steer billions of dollars towards US forces in the Pacific.

Foreign Policy said Beijing and Washington have become "desensitised" to the risk these conditions pose, and in the "militarization of foreign policy and the failure to grasp the full significance of that militarization, the pair are one accident, and a bad decision removed from a catastrophic war".

Any invasion "would be one of the most dangerous and consequential events of the 21st century", said The Times last April. It would "make the Russian attack on Ukraine look like a sideshow by comparison".

Human costs aside, a military conflict between the world's two biggest economies would lead to "a severing of global supply chains, a blow to confidence and crashing asset prices", said The Guardian's economics editor Larry Elliott. "It would have catastrophic economic consequences, up to and including a second Great Depression."

Since talks with Trump in 2019 broke down over disagreements about international sanctions on Pyongyang, Kim Jong Un has "focused on modernising his nuclear and missile arsenals", said Sky News.

In his New Year's Eve address, he warned that the actions of the US and its allies have pushed the Korean peninsula to the brink of nuclear war. And he announced that the hermit kingdom had abandoned "the existential goal of reconciling with rival South Korea", said The Associated Press.

While no direct military action has been launched from North to South since then, there are signs that tensions are gradually rising. Earlier this year, the two sides were involved in a "tit-for-tat" balloon war, said The Independent, with North Korea floating 200 balloons filled with rubbish and waste in June. That was in response to "activists" from the South, who have been sending balloons "carrying propaganda material about their democratic society and memory devices with K-pop music videos," into the North.

The South has since scrapped a "2018 non-hostility pact aimed at lowering military tensions", the paper added, showing the "psychological warfare" had "tipped over into real escalation".

The scrapping of that pact has meant hostility rising across the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), where the South has been playing "propaganda and K-pop music to the North using loudspeakers", said the BBC. In June, its soldiers fired warning shots "by mistake" at North Korean troops who had unintentionally crossed the border, though this prompted "no notable movement from the North". However, the sister of Kim Jong Un, Kim Yo Jong, said previously that the North would launch "new counteractions" if the South did not cease with its actions along the DMZ.

The increasing hostility has already seen the US become further involved, conducting a "precision-guided bombing drill with Seoul" in June along the peninsula for the first time in seven years as a "warning against North Korea", said The Independent.

In the past two or three years, various parts of the world saw conflicts that killed thousands and left millions homeless. One such conflict is currently on in Ukraine; which Russia calls its “military operation”. And another is happening in Gaza, where Israel has launched an outright war with the Palestinian militant group Hamas.

But the list does not end here. It also includes the recent Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, an armed conflict between Iran and Israel, and that between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Amid this, another war front is expected between China and Taiwan in upcoming years.

Though it’s only been used twice, the specific term “world war” applies to armed conflicts between major world powers spanning multiple regions of the globe, Schuessler said. Therefore, our notions of what a world war might look like are dependent on who the “great powers” of our era are, their relative military capabilities, and where they are found geographically.

During the height of the Cold War, for instance, Americans had a clear picture of what a “World War III” would entail — a deadly contest between East and West pitting the United States and its allies against a well-armed Soviet Union. “The main front would have been in Europe,” Schuessler said.

The picture we see today is quite different, Castillo said, as the post-Soviet Russian state and other modern adversaries of the U.S. don’t pose nearly the same threat as the USSR did. “The Russian military today is a poor imitation of the Red Army,” Castillo said.

That leaves only China, Schuessler and Castillo said. As the one nation competing with the U.S. for global economic and military sovereignty, China — not Russia — would be America’s primary opponent in a 21st century world war.

“Today, it is hard to envision a world war that does not pit the United States against China. Whether Russia would align with China in such a war is an open question,” Schuessler said. “Until the U.S. is dragged into a war against China and that war is somehow joined with the ones in Europe and the Middle East, we are not talking about a world war.”

Castillo said that we are not likely to see such a conflict any time soon. While China may be the closest thing the U.S. has to a Soviet-level rival, it remains to be seen whether the country will rise to such heights.

“Down the road, China and the U.S. might engage in a world war,” Castillo said. “But right now, China is not a military peer of the United States, like the Soviet Union was. Further, it’s not clear that China’s economy will continue to develop in a way that would make it a military peer like the Soviet Union.”

Even if global war isn’t on the horizon, recent chaos on the world stage is certainly a cause for concern, Schuessler said.

“Americans are not wrong to worry about the United States getting dragged into wars where it is supporting one side against another,” he said. “That said, the U.S. has managed to stay out of the wars in Europe and the Middle East thus far.”

Castillo said that ongoing regional conflicts may be a sign that America’s grip over the rest of the world is starting to slip. Even if they can’t encounter the U.S. directly, powers like Russia are becoming more willing and able to assert their own geopolitical interests, making it harder for the U.S. to support its post-Cold War role as “global sheriff,” he said.

“An era where the U.S. was the only great power was never going to last,” Castillo said. “Now, we live in an era where our adversaries can push back against the liberal international order.”

This marks a return to an older state of global affairs, he said — one in which multiple great powers compete for position on the world stage, and armed disputes over territory and resources are more common.

“What we are seeing is a return to great power politics,” Castillo said. “In concrete terms, this new reality means the United States will have to make hard choices about where and when it uses military power. If we do not make choices, we risk liquidating ourselves, fighting non-essential wars that weaken us, or both.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Human Rights abuses at an
   international level

The obvious conclusion to draw from the litany of human rights predicaments in 2022—from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s deliberate attacks on civilians in Ukraine and Xi Jinping’s open-air prison for the Uyghurs in China to the Taliban’s putting millions of Afghans at risk of starvation —is that unchecked authoritarian power leaves behind a sea of human suffering.

But 2022 also exposed a fundamental shift in power in the world that opens the way for all concerned governments to push back against these abuses by protecting and strengthening the global human rights system, especially when the actions of the major powers fall short or are challenging.

Pacific Island nations as a bloc have demanded more ambitious emissions reductions from those countries that are contaminating the most, while Vanuatu leads an effort to put the adverse effects of climate change before the International Court of Justice for their own sake—and ours.

And while the US Supreme Court struck down 50 years of federal protection for reproductive rights, the “green wave” of abortion-rights expansions in Latin America—notably Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico—offers a compelling counter-narrative.

Briefing the committee, Fernand De Varennes, Special Rapporteur on minority issues, highlighted the almost complete failure to normal minority rights at the United Nations, despite the Secretary-General’s guidance note on the subject in 2013.  Pointing to examples of rights violations in India, the United States and China, he noted that minorities are more than three quarters of the world’s stateless, are the most educationally deprived and are politically omitted.

He stressed that the mostly forgotten Plan of Action suggested by the Secretary-General in 2013 must be revitalized and a permanent forum on minorities set up at the United Nations. Unless the Organization gives them a focus, the international community will continue to see increases in statelessness, hate speech on social media and violence against minorities worldwide, he said.

Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The State of the World’s Human Rights found that double standards and inadequate responses to human rights abuses taking place around the world fueled impunity and instability, including silence on Saudi Arabia’s human rights record, inaction on Egypt and the refusal to oppose Israel’s system of apartheid against Palestinians.

The report also highlights China’s use of strong-arm tactics to overwhelm international action on crimes against humanity it has committed, as well as the failure of global and regional institutions – constrained by the self-interest of their members – to respond adequately to conflicts killing thousands of people including in Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Yemen.

“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a chilling example of what can happen when states think they can flout international law and violate human rights without consequences,” said Agnès Callamard, Amnesty International’s Secretary General.

“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was created 75 years ago, out of the ashes of the Second World War. At its core is the universal recognition that all people have rights and essential freedoms. While global power dynamics are in chaos, human rights cannot be lost in the fray. They should guide the world as it steers an increasingly volatile and dangerous environment. We must not wait for the world to burn again.”

In 2022, Russian rebels were taken to court and media houses were shut down just for mentioning the war in Ukraine. Journalists were imprisoned in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Russia, Belarus, and dozens of other countries across the world where conflicts raged.

In Australia, India, Indonesia and the UK, authorities passed new legislation imposing restrictions on protests while Sri Lanka used emergency powers to curtail mass protests amidst the spiraling economic crisis. The UK law gives police officers wide-ranging powers, including the ability to ban “noisy protests,” undermining the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly.

Technology was weaponized against many, to silence, prevent public assembly or disinform.

We have seen world leaders sceptically trading away human rights obligations and accountability for human rights abusers in exchange for seeming short-term political wins. US presidential candidate Joe Biden’s principled pledge to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah state” over its human rights record was embowelled once he was in office and facing high gas prices by his bro-like fist bump with Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed Bin Salman. And the Biden administration, despite its bombast about prioritising democracy and human rights in Asia, has tempered criticism of abuses and increasing despotism in India, Thailand, the Philippines, and elsewhere in the region for security and economic reasons, instead of recognising that all are linked.

Of course, these kinds of double standards are not solely the purview of global superpowers. Pakistan has supported the United Nations high commissioner for human rights’ monitoring of abuses in Muslim-majority Kashmir, but owing to its close relationship with China, has turned its back on possible crimes against humanity, against Uyghur and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. Pakistan’s hypocrisy is especially glaring given its coordinator role of the 57-member Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

Human rights disasters do not arise from nowhere. Governments that fail to live up to their legal obligations to protect human rights at home sow the seeds of discontent, instability, and eventually crisis. Left unchecked, the egregious actions of abusive governments escalate, cementing the belief that corruption, censorship, impunity, and violence are the most effective tools to achieve their aims. Ignoring human rights violations carries a heavy cost, and the ripple effects should not be underrated.

But in a world of shifting power, we also found opportunity in preparing our 2023 World Report, which examines the state of human rights in nearly 100 countries. Each issue needs to be understood and addressed on its own merits, and each requires leadership. Any state that recognizes the power that comes from working in concert with others to affect human rights change can provide that leadership. There is more space, not less, for governments to stand up and adopt rights-respecting plans of action.

New coalitions and new voices of leadership have emerged that can shape and further this trend. South Africa, Namibia, and Indonesia have paved the way for more governments to recognize that Israeli authorities are committing the crime against humanity of apartheid against Palestinians.

Pacific Island nations as a bloc have demanded more determined emissions reductions from those countries that are polluting the most, while Vanuatu leads an effort to put the adverse effects of climate change before the International Court of Justice for their own sake—and ours.

And while the US Supreme Court struck down 50 years of federal protection for reproductive rights, the “green wave” of abortion-rights expansions in Latin America—notably Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico—offers a compelling counter-narrative.

Ukraine: Beacon and Rebuke

Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February and ensuing atrocities quickly rose to the top of the world’s human rights agenda in 2022. After Ukrainian troops forced the Russian military’s withdrawal from Bucha, north of the capital, Kyiv, the UN found that at least 70 civilians had been the victims of unlawful killings, including summary executions, which are war crimes. This pattern of Russian atrocity has been repeated innumerable times.

At the Drama Theatre in Mariupol, hundreds of displaced residents took refuge, painting the Russian word “DETI” (children) on the ground outside in letters so large they could be seen in satellite imagery. This alert was meant to protect the civilians, including many children, sheltering inside. Instead, it seemed only to serve as an inducement for Russian forces whose bombs destroyed the building and killed at least a dozen, and likely more, of its occupants. Inflicting civilian suffering, such as the repeated strikes on the energy infrastructure that Ukrainians depend on for electricity, water, and heat, seems to be a central part of the Kremlin’s strategy.

Putin’s boldness has been made possible largely because of his longstanding free hand to operate with impunity. The loss of civilian life in Ukraine comes as no surprise to Syrians who suffered grave abuses from airstrikes following Russia’s involvement to support Syrian forces under Bashar al-Assad in 2015.

Putin tapped prominent military commanders from that campaign to lead the war effort in Ukraine, with devastating consequences for Ukrainian civilians. Russia has accompanied its brutal military actions in Ukraine with a crackdown on human rights and anti-war activists in Russia, throttling dissent and any criticism of Putin’s rule.

But one positive outcome of Russia’s actions has been to activate the full global human rights system created to deal with crises like this. The UN Human Rights Council promptly opened an investigation to document and preserve evidence of human rights violations in the war, and later created a special rapporteur to monitor the human rights situation inside Russia.

The UN General Assembly four times condemned—mostly by wide margins—both Russia’s invasion and its human rights violations. The General Assembly also suspended Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, blunting its spoiler capacity on Ukraine and other serious human rights crises on the council’s docket.

European countries welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees, a praiseworthy response that also exposed the double standards of most European Union member countries in their ongoing treatment of countless Syrians, Afghans, Palestinians, Somalis, and others seeking asylum.

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague opened a Ukraine investigation following a referral of the situation by an extraordinary number of the court’s member countries. Governments have also mobilized to weaken Putin’s global influence and military power, with the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and others imposing targeted international sanctions against Russian individuals, companies, and other entities.

This extraordinary response showed what is possible for accountability, for refugee protection, and for safeguarding the human rights of some of the world’s most vulnerable people. At the same time, the attacks on civilians and atrocious abuses in Ukraine should be a reminder that this consolidated support, critical as it is, should not be confused with a quick fix.

Rather, governments should reflect on where the situation would be if the international community had made a rigorous effort to hold Putin to account much earlier—in 2014, at the onset of the war in eastern Ukraine; in 2015, for abuses in Syria; or for the escalating human rights crackdown within Russia over the last decade.

The challenge going forward is for governments to replicate the best of the international response in Ukraine and scale up the political will to address other crises around the world until there is meaningful human rights improvement.

Issues in Ethiopia

The armed conflict in northern Ethiopia has received only a tiny fraction of the global attention focused on Ukraine, despite two years of atrocities, including a number of massacres, by the warring parties.

In 2020, tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigray’s regional authorities, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), boiled over into conflict in the Tigray region, with Amhara regional forces and Eritrea’s military supporting the Ethiopian armed forces.

The government has heavily controlled access to conflict-affected areas for independent rights investigators and journalists ever since, making examination of abuses as they unfold difficult, even as the conflict spread to the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions.

The three elected African members of the UN Security Council—Gabon, Ghana, and Kenya—as well as Russia and China, have blocked even placing Ethiopia on its formal schedule for discussion, despite the council’s mandate to maintain and restore international peace and security.

 

 

 

 

1. Wars/conflicts / terrorism in the world - its effects on people

 

Sri Lanka crisis

 

In early 2022, Sri Lankans started experiencing power cuts and shortages of basics such as fuel. The rate of inflation rose to 50% a year. As a result, protests broke out in the capital Colombo in April that year and spread across the country.

 

The country ran short of fuel for essential services such as buses, trains, and medical vehicles because it did not have enough reserves of foreign currency to import any more.

 

The fuel shortage caused petrol and diesel prices to rise dramatically.

In June last year, the government banned the sale of petrol and diesel for non-essential vehicles for two weeks. Sales of fuel remain severely restricted. Schools had to close, and people were asked to work from home to help conserve supplies.

 

Sri Lanka owes about $7bn (£5.7bn) to China and around $1bn to India. Last month, both these countries agreed to restructure their loans, giving Sri Lanka more time to repay them.

 

Afghanistan crisis

 

A devastating humanitarian crisis deepened during the year, worsened by the Taliban takeover in 2021, disasters such as earthquakes and floods, and consecutive years of drought. UN agencies estimated that the number of people in need of aid increased from 18.4 million in 2022 to nearly 29 million by August 2023.

 

The WHO warned that millions were at risk of malnutrition and disease with poor or no access to healthcare and food, including 2.3 million children at risk of acute malnutrition. In addition to international isolation and financial sanctions in response to the Taliban takeover, the country’s UN humanitarian response programme had received only 34.8% of its funding as of November 2023. Humanitarian challenges were set to increase amid Pakistan’s mass deportation of Afghan refugees. Iran and Türkiye also continued to deport Afghan refugees.

 

The healthcare system continued to be dependent on international aid and remained fragile due to lack of adequate infrastructure and resources.

 

The Taliban’s draconian restrictions on the rights of women and girls, together with the use of arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearance and torture and other ill-treatment, were found by Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) to amount to the crime against humanity of gender persecution.

 

In April, the Taliban extended the ban on women working outside the home to include jobs with the UN, creating additional challenges in delivering humanitarian aid. Bans remained on women working in the public sector, except in areas such as healthcare, primary education, or specific security institutions such as airports or women’s prisons. Women were banned from appearing in public alone or travelling for more than 72km without a male chaperone. Beauty salons were forcibly closed from July, affecting some 60,000 women-owned businesses, according to UN reports.

 

Environmental issues occurring due to wars

 

Environmental issues arising from wars can be severe and long-lasting. Human life loss is not the only issue here. There are some more severe issues arising. Here is a concise overview of some key impacts:

 

1. Habitat destruction: Bombings, troop movements, and military operations can devastate ecosystems.

 

1. Pollution:

   - Chemical weapons contaminate soil and water

   - Oil spills from damaged infrastructure

   - Increased air pollution from military vehicles and explosions

 

1. Deforestation: Often occurs for strategic purposes or fuel

 

1. Water contamination: Damaged infrastructure and chemical runoff pollute water sources

 

1. Soil degradation: Explosives and chemical agents can render land infertile

 

1. Wildlife disruption: Animals are killed or displaced by combat and habitat loss

 

1. Unexploded ordnance: Poses long-term risks to both humans and wildlife

 

1. Resource depletion: Overexploitation of natural resources to support war efforts

 

1. Climate impact: Increased greenhouse gas emissions from military operations

 

1. Nuclear contamination: In cases of nuclear warfare or damage to nuclear facilities

 

1. Marine ecosystem contamination: Let’s be honest that the marine ecosystem is also getting contaminated due to frequent exposure from the naval ships and ammunitions. Marine biologists are already concerned that almost half of the marine flora and fauna are destroyed and are hard to revive.

 

These issues can persist long after conflicts end, complicating post-war recovery efforts.

 

Myanmar crisis:

Bringing the multifaceted crisis in Myanmar to the fore, speakers urged the Security Council today to take decisive measures to end violence by that country’s military and address the deteriorating humanitarian situation, also calling for the swift appointment of a United Nations Special Envoy to enhance the Organisation’s engagement on the matter.

“The expansion of armed conflict throughout the country has deprived communities of basic needs and access to essential services,” said Khaled Khiari, Assistant Secretary-General for Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Departments of Political and Peace-building Affairs and Peace Operations, in his briefing to the 15-member body.

More than three years have passed since the military overturned the democratically elected Government in Myanmar and detained its leaders, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, he recalled, underscoring the Secretary-General’s call for their immediate release and a unified international response. Any solution to the current crisis requires conditions that allow the people of Myanmar to exercise their human rights freely and peacefully, including an end to the military’s campaign of violence and political repression, he added.

He went on to express concern about the military’s intention to move ahead with elections, also noting the repercussions of the military government’s announcement to enforce the conscription law.  In addition, Myanmar has become a global epicentre of methamphetamine and opium production, and home to a rapid expansion of international cyber scam operations, particularly in border areas.  “What began as a regional crime threat in South-East Asia is now a rampant human trafficking and illicit trade crisis with global implications,” he said, adding:  “There is a clear case for greater international unity and support to the region.”

The United Nations will continue to complement the work of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and support its efforts to implement its Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar.  To that end, the Secretary-General plans to appoint a Special Envoy “in the coming days” to engage with ASEAN, Member States and all stakeholders to advance towards a Myanmar-led political solution to the crisis, he added.

Briefing the Council on the humanitarian situation in that country was Lisa Doughten, Director of the Financing and Partnerships Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.  She reported that 2.8 million people have been displaced, 90 per cent of them since the military takeover.  Furthermore, hunger is on the rise across the country and there is a risk of malnutrition among children and pregnant women.

Tibet crisis

The India-Tibet border or contemporarily known as the Sino-Indian border crisis is a long-standing issue, rooted in complex history, geopolitics, and the invasion of Tibet in 1950. The country had long been considered a buffer zone between China and India, but as British colonial power expanded into the Himalayan region, tensions between India and China began to rise.

In 1914, the British signed the Shimla Convention with Tibet, which effectively established the borders between Tibet and British India. The accord effectively recognised Tibet as an independent state, however, the Qing refused to participate in the negotiations, as it was seen as a direct challenge to Qing sovereignty.

After the fall of the Qing dynasty in China in 1912, the empire split, with local warlords and regional governments vying for control. For Tibet, it was a chance to reclaim its long sought-after independence and govern its own nation. But in 1949, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party took power, and their new government immediately set its sights on capturing Tibet.

In 1950, China invaded Tibet and brutally established control over the region. This put China in direct conflict with India, as the border between the two ran along the Himalayan Mountain range, which is the border between Tibet and India. India was alarmed by China’s actions and began to provide support to Tibetan freedom fighters who were fighting for their people, their homes and their right to self-determination.

In 1962, some years after the first Tibetan national uprising, tensions between India and China boiled over into open conflict, when China launched a military offensive against India across the Himalayan border. The conflict was brief, but it resulted in a decisive victory for China, and they were able to seize control of several strategic positions along the border.

The aftermath of the conflict was marked by bitterness and recriminations on both sides. India accused China of aggression and territorial expansionism, while China accused India of ‘meddling in its internal affairs’ and supporting “Tibetan separatists.” The border between the two countries remained tense and heavily militarised, with both sides conducting regular patrols and military exercises in the region.

New research shows that China is recruiting Tibetans to police their own borders on behalf of the PLA, however, on the other side of the border are also Tibetans in the Special Frontier Force (SFF) longing to return and free their home. The continuing escalation of this conflict could now see Tibetans shedding Tibetan blood.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

17.  Donald Trump shooting
during election rallies

Donald Trump was the target of an apparent assassination attempt on Sunday, a mere two months after the Republican presidential nominee was shot in the ear at a rally in Butler.

There were no bullets fired by the suspect in Sunday's incident, thanks to what the Secret Service has labelled as a "hyper vigilant" agent who spotted a gun muzzle poking out from bushes at Trump's Florida golf course.

The suspect, Ryan Wesley Routh, faced court today and was charged with federal gun crimes. He could potentially face more charges.

The FBI is investigating Routh's social media accounts, which show a man with a strong focus on the war in Ukraine. The 58-year-old also has a criminal history dating back to the 1990s.

In his first public comments since the most recent incident, Trump described hearing "four or five shots" in a live event on X on Monday evening. "The Secret Service did a great job," he said, blaming "political foes" for "rhetoric" that preceded the shooting.

There have been bi-partisan calls to better protect presidential candidates after this second disturbing incident in a matter of weeks.

During his address on X, Trump also recalls the attack against his life in July 2024 in Butler, Pennsylvania.

“That was some crazy day, and yesterday you had another one with a different result, actually much better result,” Trump says.

"Perhaps it's God wanting me to be president to save this country," he says.

He blames the two incidents on “rhetoric” from his political foes, which he says have referred to him as a “danger to democracy”.

“Looks like they were both radical leftists,” he says of the suspected perpetrators of the two incidents, without providing evidence.

Trump notes that a “civilian” woman in the area was able to get a picture of the gunman’s number plate and provide it to authorities, who then tracked him down.

Trump, speaking in a live X Spaces event to promote cryptocurrency, is talking about the latest attempt on his life.

He says he was golfing on a “beautiful day” when he heard “probably four or five” shots ring out in the near distance.

He was immediately evacuated by the Secret Service, which he praises for doing an “excellent job” by identifying and engaging the gunman after seeing a rifle barrel in the bushes, as well as by evacuating him from the golf course, saying that they “moved along pretty good” once danger was detected.

“I would have liked to sink that last putt, but we decided, let’s get out of here,” he adds, in his first comments since the attack at his Florida home.

Former United States President and Republican nominee for the 2024 US elections, Donald Trump has survived a second assassination attempt after shots were fired near the Trump International Golf Course in West Palm Beach, Florida on September 15, 2024, reports said.

This shooting incident comes just months ahead of the November 2024 US presidential elections and only two months after Trump was first shot at during an election rally. The AP reported that US Secret Service agents opened fire after seeing a person with a firearm near the golf course on Sunday.

An AK-style firearm was recovered near the golf course, the AP reported.

Spokesperson Anthony Guglielmi in a statement on social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter), said that the Secret Service is investigating “a protective incident involving Trump" which happened shortly before 2 pm on September 15.

In a fundraising email, Trump assured his supporters and addressed the situation, stating, “There were gunshots in my vicinity, but I want you to hear this from me first: I AM SAFE AND WELL! Before rumours get out of hand, know that I am okay. Nothing will slow me down. I will NEVER SURRENDER! I will always appreciate your support."

Trump’s campaign communications director Steven Cheung said in a statement that the 2024 Republican presidential nominee “is safe following gunshots in his vicinity" and didn’t provide further details.

The suspect of the shooting has been identified as Ryan Wesley Routh. He has been arrested by officials and the attack is under investigation, AP reported citing officials.

Routh reportedly dropped his weapon and fled in an SUV and was later taken into custody in a neighbouring county, authorities told AP. His motive is unclear.

Local authorities said the gunman had two backpacks hanging on a fence and a GoPro camera.

Routh was convicted in 2002 of possessing a weapon of mass destruction, according to North Carolina Department of Adult Correction online records.

In a post on his own social media platform Truth Social, Donald Trump thanked the US Secret Service and other law enforcement officials for keeping him safe during the assassination attempt.

“THE JOB DONE WAS ABSOLUTELY OUTSTANDING. I would like to thank everyone for your concern and well wishes — It was certainly an interesting day! Most importantly, I want to thank the US Secret Service, Sheriff Ric Bradshaw and his Office of brave and dedicated patriots, and, all of the law enforcement, for the incredible job done today at Trump International in keeping me, as the 45th President of the United States, and the Republican nominee in the upcoming presidential election, SAFE," he wrote.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Bangladesh Crisis

Widespread, violent protests have led to the ousting of Bangladesh’s Prime Minister and unfortunately claimed the lives of over 600 people. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has been compelled to suspend several of its vital programs in the nation due to safety concerns and the shutdown of communications networks.

 

Amidst the crisis, Rohingya refugees—especially women and children—face heightened susceptibilities and safety concerns. Meanwhile, extreme flooding has affected 5.5 million people, destroyed critical infrastructure and worsened humanitarian needs.

 

Violent protests have erupted in Bangladesh following the reinstatement of a quota system for civil service roles. Protestors are calling for electoral reform and justice for victims of the unrest. The persistent demonstrations compelled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to leave her post and flee the country. The President is forming an interim government, and the European Union has called for an orderly transition to democracy.

 

Authorities resorted to extreme measures, including blocking communication services, enforcing curfews with shoot-on-sight orders and challenging protesters with arms.

 

More than 600 people have died, over 450,000 have been arrested—but declared free of charges by Bangladesh’s interim government—and several thousands of others have been injured. Due to a lack of internet connectivity and information, it is likely that the actual figures are higher than those reported.

 

Reports show extensive looting and arson incidents have occurred at the Prime Minister's residence and office, along with various government and private establishments.

 

Children, women and Rohingya refugees are among those most impacted by escalating insecurity in Bangladesh. The continuous mass protests worsen the humanitarian needs of refugees affected by climate-related shocks, including the extreme flooding that affected 11 out of 64 Bangladeshi provinces in August 2024.

 

With tensions high and security uncertain, it is crucial that steps be taken to protect those most at risk during this tumultuous time. The government must prioritise the safety and well-being of children and refugees, providing them with adequate resources and support to weather these challenges.

 

The precise sequence of events leading to Sheikh Hasina’s resignation as prime minister of Bangladesh and departure for India on August 5 may not be available, but it appears to have followed the reluctance of the army to try and forcibly interdict the oncoming mass of people, as may have been the wish of the prime minister.

This left no option for her but to relinquish office and, as insisted upon by family, seek safety outside Bangladesh. In Nepal, too, in April 2006, the Royal Nepal Army refused to fire on fellow citizens, leading to the political retreat and eventual resignation of the king.

Several factors merged in reaching the outcome on August 5. The previous three national elections, in 2024, 2018, and 2014, with no Opposition participation and charges of manipulation, resulted in massive victories for the Awami League.

While the government could rightly claim that this year’s election was held under existing rules, the absence of any Opposition left many people questioning its legitimacy. The economic performance of the government was commendable, and Bangladesh was poised to become a middle-income country by 2026, its per capita GDP already exceeding India’s.

But the government was seen to be restrictive towards press freedom and the West, in particular, raised questions of human rights violations, notably against the Rapid Action Battalion. There were charges of widespread corruption. For some time now, observers felt that the government had distanced itself from the people.

In 2009, Hasina inherited from the predecessor civilian government, where the Jamaat was a partner, a record of benign indifference to Islamic fundamentalism. To her credit, she was successful in largely controlling activities of hardcore Islamists, while holding out an olive branch to moderate elements. This could not have been done with kid gloves and would have contributed to charges of human rights infractions.

Ironically, the current agitation started in June, after the High Court reinstated a quota system abolished by the government in 2018. The issue was subjudice. The primary issue at stake was the 30% quota for the progeny of freedom fighters. In its eventual judgement, the court reduced this to 5%.

As Bangladesh faces regime change, an expert warned that one of the tasks before the new government will be "to stop the free fall of the economy." It is now feared that the damage from mass violence, unemployment, persisting inflation, and "slowed real GDP [Gross Domestic Product] growth" may impact Bangladesh's economy.

Saad Hammadi, a fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, told Al Jazeera, “The job of the interim and subsequent government will be extremely challenging to stop the free fall of the economy and recover the state at a time when even the global economic and political orders are extremely chaotic.”

Thousands of protesters stormed and looted the prime minister's residence. Several police stations, buildings and public assets were vandalised and set on fire. Harrowing visuals showed a ransacked Awami League's central office, arson attacks, a mural of Hasina vandalised, damaged vehicles and protesters trying to demolish a large statue of Hasina's father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The Foreign Investors' Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) said on July 29 that the recent shutdown "significantly impacted Bangladesh's economy with over $10 billion" and expected estimated losses to increase. It added that the FMCG industry would have a setback of over $100 million, local media reported.

Violence in any nation, or even in a small area, costs hefty amounts as it hampers several economic activities. These include the day-to-day operations of local markets, hospitals, transport and offices, food delivery systems, e-commerce and "MSMEs that rely on social commerce". Violence also impacts human productivity.

 

21st century’s Mahabharata

 

As India continues on its journey from a $3 trillion to $10 trillion economy, as it reorients its political pendulum from permissions and entitlements to development and prosperity, as it resets its strategic stance from apologetic-defensive to confident-expansive, and redefines its cultural arc from being moored in a timid crust to one that carries international hues, it needs not merely the modern tools of engagement and technology to negotiate the world’s constantly-changing landscape but a stronger civilisational base upon which it can stand with knowledge, dynamism, force and stability; it needs to reimagine itself and re-identify with its own ethos and its own experiences.

Amongst its experiential kaleidoscope evolved over millennia, there are four important civilisational legs that have sustained India for more than five millenniums – the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Puranas and the Epics (the Ramayana and the Mahabharata). The Vedas captured the insights of rishis and eternalised them into words and three notes, a combination of language and sounds that resonates with our deepest parts even today as truth, a living entity in our being, and a universal reality. The Upanishads condensed them into an intellectual treatise of spiritual knowledge using which a seeker could confirm her intuitions with experience and not be limited to logic of the mental mind. The Puranas, essentially commentaries on the Vedas and the Upanishads, converted the knowledge into stories and metaphors. The Epics brought all this knowledge to the people through two of India’s greatest sagas, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata.

This essay focusses on the Mahabharata and how it had been lost and now finally reclaimed by scholarship over the past five decades. As every Indian knows, the Mahabharata brings together not just the scriptural knowledge of the Vedas and the Upanishads into one comprehensive Indian treatise, but is equally an encyclopaedia of all practical matters, from complexities of governance to intricacies of statecraft. The idea of creating and using the bureaucracy to run a kingdom, for instance, is rooted in this text, the world’s largest, ten times longer than the Iliad and the Odyssey combined. With equal intensity the Mahabharata showcases models of governance, military and strategy.

In the course of Islamic invasions, much of this knowledge and culture residing in temples was systematically exiled to the peripheries of India. The conscious decimation of the education system by the next set of rulers, the British, impoverished it. As if the physical and economic strangulation of Indian knowledge were not enough, 19th century European Indologists created a narrative that hijacked the Mahabharata, colonised it intellectually and pointed fingers of suspicion on its authenticity, its origins, its culture, its authorship, its characters, its physical and metaphysical truths. Despite these assaults, the Mahabharata refused to die. The knowledge of a civilisation – different from the confines history places on scholars – rests in the consciousness of its people and the dictum that ‘no Indian reads the Mahabharata for the first time’ is something every Indian can vouch for experientially.

Post-Independence, the rebirth of a free India also saw the resurgence of the Mahabharata. Today, a three-pronged scholarship is according the Mahabharata its rightful place, cleaning it of colonial contaminations, bringing India’s definitive text back to the people of India, in whose DNA it resides, in whose blood it runs, in whose bones it thrives, in whose consciousness it becomes ubiquitous, in whose souls it has always been present, and will remain. Stripped of all biases and politics embedded into it, this scholarly troika has taken 50 years to mature and reclaim the epic verse by verse. And now, it has brought a new direction to the way we can view our ancient moorings.

First, through the heroic effort of V.S. Sukthankar, who, as the first general editor, created the Critical Edition of the Mahabharata, published by the Pune-based Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Supported by fellow scholars and adventurers who continued Sukthankar’s work, including the use of mathematical methods to arrive at the precise text, one parva after another, one verse at a time, the scholars consulted 1,259 manuscripts over five decades to release the complete Critical Edition in September 1966. Until then, there were multiple recensions of the text from all over India, with varying narratives and details.

Through the Critical Edition, Sukthankar established the definitive text, the earliest source from which all surviving manuscripts were copied, which scholars call the ‘archetype’. This text has not only put out the final word – including, for instance, the fact that the Mahabharata has 73,569 verses across 1,995 chapters, plus an additional 6,073 verses in 118 chapters in its Harivamsha appendix — but also preserved all the regional recensions in the form of a gigantic apparatus of variant readings and additional episodes. Many of these manuscripts have since been lost, so the Critical Edition now represents the Mahabharata and through it the intellectual and material heritage of India. This must now be preserved in every form, using every available technology.

Second, the conversion of this text from Sanskrit into English for a wider reach, access, critical examination. The first attempt at translating the Critical Edition was by J.A.B. van Buitenen at the University of Chicago, who between 1973 and 1978 published five volumes till Virata Parva, and remains a work in progress under his successor James L. Fitzgerald. Other major translations have come from the Clay Sanskrit Library that began the translation of the Kinjawadekar Edition in 2006 but abandoned it in three years. Of course, the earliest attempted English translation of the Mahabharata remains the Calcutta Edition, first by Kisari Mohan Ganguly in 1896 and followed by Manmatha Nath Dutt in 1905. More recently Bibek Debroy has successfully translated all the volumes of the Critical Edition and made it accessible to the lay reader, a herculean effort spread over four years of intense work that concluded in 2014.

And third, using the Critical Edition as a base and deep scholarship as a tool, reframing the narrative such that the Mahabharata returns to where it belongs – a timeless-seamless flow of the story in its mundane, ethical and metaphysical planes, containing every aspect of the Indian experience in it. In the war of interpretation of the Mahabharata, Vishwa Adluri and Joydeep Bagchee through rigorous study have explored the idea of the scientific method in the human sciences (The Nay Science in 2014) and the history of Western interpretive approaches to the Mahabharata and their evaluation in terms of their intellectual cogency using textual criticism (Philology and Criticism in 2018). Together, these two books give us robust arguments about the Mahabharata, expose the biases of Western scholarship that has dominated the intellectual discourse around it, and motivate us towards deeper understanding and further explorations.

All three – Sukthankar’s text, Debroy’s translation and the Adluri-Bagchee resituating – are tools to recover the Mahabharata. In a modern Mahabharata of sorts, a war of ideas and views fought on an intellectual Kurukshetra between the dominant Western and Leftist views on the one side and the Indian tradition on the other, truth, a complex one, has finally emerged. Sukthankar revealed the text in its entirety with meticulous line-by-line comparisons, the manuscript relationships between a text and its various versions, and delivered to us the final word. Debroy made it accessible to the English reader, in a more contemporary language. And finally, Adluri-Bagchee framed their arguments to illustrate that the Indian intellectual tradition has the means and knowledge to interpret its texts in its own way, recognising the philosophical-logical path of Adi Shankaracharya.

The 20th century saw Mahabharata scholarship being snatched away from India to the West, and then shredded and discarded argue Adluri-Bagchee Philology and Criticism. Here were born theories of contamination, ideas of reconstruction, arguments of a single manuscript. This line of thinking had reduced the Mahabharata to an extension of Brahminism, the original story nothing more than a fratricidal struggle for kingdom, the light-skinned and handsome invaders from the north who brought culture to a dark, weak, ugly, savage people who needed to be civilised. It was conveyed that the text is little more than an expression of several hands that have twisted and moulded the story of invaders and made it Indian.

In the war of civilisations, this weapon attempted to shred the dignity of the colonised and catalysed the capture of many imaginations. In the conquests of Africa, South America and Asia, if guns and canons were the tools of physical control, scholarship laced with religion was the medium of psychological subjugation and cultural arrogation. In the areas of social sciences, as scholarship degenerated into creating motivated narratives, scholars become mercenaries of control, missionaries of evangelisation.

Pulling the Mahabharata out of these narratives would have been impossible had it not been for these three legs of scholarship – the text, the translation and the analysis – now giving the Critical Edition the stability of form, its translation a global access, its analyses an Indian intellectual context. They allow us to reclaim learnings, experiences and histories from the hands of those whose entitlement to knowledge is questionable. Wendy Doniger, for instance, has termed the Critical Edition a “Frankenstein’s monster, pieced together from various scraps of different bodies”, and its editors “the Frankensteins.” She is not alone in her contempt for another’s reality, but for scholars this is a trait devoid of scientific temperament and humility.

In fact, the Critical Edition is a rigorously scientific and logical text – it is not an amalgamation of several texts; it is a mathematical synthesis to arrive at textual precision. It has created a dharmic context for its timeless expression. It has shown how the Mahabharata is indeed the fifth Veda with spirituality compressed into its pages, and equality of access an integral part of its structure. It has offered us a handbook containing every nuance of Indian thought, from the individual to the State, foreign policy to strategy, rituals to dharma, well-being of the people to their taxation. It has delivered a philosophical treatise that captures the essence of Indian civilisation through the idiom of storytelling.

It has given us the literary infrastructure upon which to ride, to explore and to produce new knowledge. This is now leading India to salvage the Mahabharata, through fictional retellings, through non-fiction books and papers, through theatre, cinema, mass media, feeding an unquenched thirst for Indian knowledge. The new reclamation is a function of new facts, new contexts – and eternal truths of the Indian intellectual tradition. We need to appreciate the labour, understand both the text as well as the politics, and set sail on an intellectual adventure to discover the unknown. On the Kurukshetra of scholarship, India has won the Mahabharata and reclaimed its civilisation.

In strategic studies, for instance, our policymakers need to study the 4,512 verses in the Rajadharma Parva (part of the 12th chapter, Shanti Parva). These verses are essential reading for policy professionals in the areas of military studies and international relations. In policy conversations, they need to be able to use and quote Ved Vyasa’s Mahabharata or Chanakya’s Arthashastra, at least half as well as they do Sun Tzu’s The Art of War or Machiavelli’s Prince.

Narratives need communities. And communities comprise people, who grow and evolve. The new and young demographic of India needs to take learnings from the Mahabharata and apply them to present day questions, from geopolitical strategies to the future of work in the fourth industrial revolution, that have deep, lasting and robust answers in the Mahabharata. No conversation about a ‘New India’ can be complete without an intense reading of the Mahabharata, an eternal text that awaits the country’s preordained 21st century manifestation.

Mahabharata is a bedrock of values indigenous to India. The most important among the Indic values is the concept of Dharma. The itihasa is hence eternally relevant and is a reference at times of dilemma or when seeking guidance.

Mahabharata has a special place as a handbook for individual and state dharma, because it provides case studies spanning across several generations and in some cases across multiple births of the same jiva. This comprehensive nature of case studies helps us to zoom in on the best option suitable for us, irrespective of us being student, teacher, citizen, soldier, minister, diplomat or whatever possible role that can be imagined.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

In the 21st Century’s Mahābhārata; dictatorship, communism, socialism, etc., are so rampant, as we see some countries following independent administration. They are using the power of each country persistently for war and terrorism both inside and outside the country. They do not perceive the real problems human beings face in their own country.

They have single-mindedly indulged in manufacturing dangerous weapons on a massive scale. This destruction of the planet is constantly putting all the flora and fauna under a huge existential threat. No wonder, why climate crisis is a burning issue nowadays.

God developed man as an amazing creature among all his creation. Man has the power to develop tools for bringing happiness and joy in life. Humans are considered as the most intelligent creatures on Earth. Men have made a class-wise society in their everyday life. This means that well-to-do people started to employ poorer people for doing their work and took pleasure in their own lives. Simply put, rich people started to keep slaves for getting their work done.

According to a US report, there was an increase of 35.6% over the 23,191,876 persons enumerated during the 1850 census. The total population included 3,953,760 slaves. By the time, the 1860 census results were ready for tabulation, the nation was plummeting into the American Civil War.

During this period, the British were ruling India and many other provinces. The English Education Act of 1835 was the Council of India's statutory Act, which gave effect to a decision by Lord William Bentinck, the then Governor-General of the British East India Company, to reallocate funds that the British Parliament needed to spend on education and literature in India.

This English education system also created a class division in the Indian society. Educated people who were well versed in English secured an authoritative position to rule the society, whereas people who went to local schools and studied in the local language were treated like slaves. Slowly, everyone started believing that only the English language can give them power and influence to control the society. Local people were good enough only for low-paying menial jobs which made the English treat them like slaves.

In developed countries like USA, China and Japan, scientists created robots to extract work. Robots replaced human slaves. They started treating humans with utmost respect and stopped looking down upon them from the slavery point of view.

Any Mahābhārata written after the end of the war means the death of the world's inhabitants. The author has written the 21st Century’s Mahābhārata before the World War III was triggered in the interest of the world’s inhabitants.

The world is experiencing a record number of conflicts and crises since the end of World War II. From the war in Gaza, which is hitting civilians particularly hard to the fighting in Sudan, which has caused a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, to the problems caused by drought and water scarcity in many other countries. By 2025, up to 300 million people will need humanitarian aid. What conflicts and crises should we be watching out for in 2025?

The list of conflicts and crises above is of course not exhaustive. The situation could escalate in many other places, whether in Yemen, where the economy is on the verge of collapse after nine years of conflict; in Haiti, where violence is increasing as the political crisis deepens; in Myanmar, which has faced a critical deterioration since a military coup in February 2021, exacerbated by renewed clashes between armed groups and the government in 2024; or in Niger, which saw a coup last July. Violence is also rising rapidly in Burkina Faso or South Sudan, among many other places.

The work of humanitarian organisations such as Caritas Czech Republic stays much needed in helping people affected by the current crises and conflicts around the world. Geopolitical risks posed by elections, polarisation and conflicts within and between states have inevitable knock-on effects on the economy, both globally and for individual countries. This year more than ever, managing these risks and shoring up institutions that promote stability are essential.

The war in Ukraine and the conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Middle East – further complicated by Houthi missile attacks on ships in the Red Sea – highlight the extent to which geopolitical developments are a key determinant of global economic performance in 2025.

Elections around the world are also likely to have a significant impact on the direction of the global economy. With at least 64 countries going to the polls, this effect will be seen not only through potential changes in trade and investment policies but also by increased uncertainty and political polarisation.

The term geopolitics denotes a broad analytical framework in international relations, encompassing different phenomena such as political instability, tensions and military conflicts between countries, terrorist threats or geographical events that can have regional or global impacts. The global economy can be affected by geopolitical events both directly and indirectly through financial, trade and commodity price channels.

In terms of financial markets, this happens both through direct capital controls or financial sanctions, and indirectly through increased uncertainty, higher risk premia or asset price surges (Catalán et al, 2023).

On the trade side, increased restrictions due to tensions between countries can disrupt trade flows and cause supply chain problems even in third-party countries. Restrictions can also affect commodity prices and lead to shortages of key resources such as oil and gas, affecting industrial production worldwide.

Taken together and mutually reinforcing each other, the global economy can experience higher inflation, lower growth and significant welfare losses in times of geopolitical tension (Góes and Bekkers, 2022).

The term geopolitics is also used in the context of internal political affairs, which can influence domestic and global financial markets. In this sense, governments can influence economic activity through various fiscal policies (taxes and spending), and economic and strategic decisions based on different priorities, depending on their political orientation.

Further, rising population poses significant threats to long-term stability and economic performance. Populist governments often implement policies that can bring short-term benefits at the expense of long-term sustainability. Such policies include trade protectionism or increased government spending (fiscal expansion), which can disrupt global trade flows, increase market volatility and hinder long-term growth.

A recent study covering a sample of 60 countries between 1990 and 2020 shows that countries experience significantly lower output and real GDP per capita growth in the medium and long term under populist governments (Funke et al, 2023). In turn, economic policies and outcomes have a profound impact on politics – shaping public opinion and voter behaviour and affecting the balance of power.

Typically, good economic performance – such as strong economic growth, low unemployment and stable inflation – tend to favour incumbent leaders and political parties. Conversely, research shows that bad economic outcomes, including high unemployment and high inflation, can lead to popular discontent and increase the voter turnout at election time (Burden and Wichowsky, 2014; Marx et al, 2022; Frank and Martínez, 2023).

In addition, some studies show that economic recessions cause political landscapes to reshuffle (Giuliani and Massari, 2019). They can also pave the way for populist and non-mainstream political parties (Hernández and Kriesi, 2016).

Measuring geopolitical risks is an important but arduous task. One method is the geopolitical risk index (GPR), which is constructed using the frequency of articles in leading newspapers that discuss adverse geopolitical events such as wars, terrorism and tensions among political organisations (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022).

As a continuous measure of risk, higher GPR values indicate higher intensity of adverse events, increased probability of negative events in the future, and greater expected intensity of future negative events.

Related empirical studies show that higher GPR values are associated with higher oil prices (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024), lower firm- and country-level investment (Wang et al, 2023), higher inflation, lower economic activity and lower trade (Caldara et al, 2022), more volatile capital flows (Kaya and Erden, 2023) and lower levels of private sector credit in emerging markets (Lu et al, 2020).

Many of the significant geopolitical risks that the world will face in 2025 come from existing conflicts and tensions. Experts have identified the elections in the United States (amid increasing polarisation and declining trust in the country’s political system); a possible escalation of the Israel-Hamas conflict into a wider conflagration in the Middle East; and a further deepening of the Russia-Ukraine war as top of the list (Bremmer and Kupchan, 2024).

In relation to the crisis in the Middle East, a central-case scenario of a limited military conflict has been suggested (Bremmer and Kupchan, 2024).

But the likelihood of a larger regional war has increased due to the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea. In addition, although less likely, there is a risk that the regional war could result in actions against or by Iran that could significantly disrupt Iranian and global oil supplies.

Further, the crisis in the Middle East could have a significant impact on global markets, even without disrupting oil supplies. Given that approximately 12% of global maritime trade passes through the Red Sea, the Houthi attacks are likely to keep freight insurance rates elevated, cause longer trade journeys, disrupt supply chains and increase inflationary pressures.

At the same time, the situation in Ukraine is becoming increasingly challenging as the likelihood of a de facto partitioning of the country has increased (Bremmer and Kupchan, 2024).

Russia holds material advantage, and its economic and military capabilities have strengthened. Ukraine, on the other hand, grapples with manpower shortages and needs to enhance defence production.

What’s more, political and economic support from the United States is weakening, while the European Union (EU) is affected by fiscal limitations and a lack of political consensus. Political implications – such as damage to the credibility of NATO and the United States – aside, a partitioned Ukraine would continue to pose challenges to the global economy, particularly through further disruptions to oil and food markets.

Outside these major risks posed by conflicts, the world is facing others posed by unregulated and more powerful artificial intelligence (AI) tools, increased protectionism, which disrupts the trade of critical minerals, and the failure to address macroeconomic and financial market vulnerabilities.

Increased cooperation among rogue states – such as Iran, North Korea and Russia – and the setbacks to the Chinese growth model also bring international risks (Bremmer and Kupchan, 2024).

Researchers’ assessment of global risks indicates a high probability of sub-par global GDP growth due to tighter monetary policies (Bremmer and Kupchan, 2024). More generally, the probability of a deeper economic contraction, resulting from monetary overtightening, financial shocks and higher energy prices due to heightened geopolitical risks has slightly increased with the escalation of conflicts in the last quarter of 2023.

Over half of the world’s population will vote in general or local elections worldwide this year. Unsurprisingly, therefore, elections will be a key political theme in 2024.

Some elections, such as those in Indonesia, Mexico and Türkiye, may have limited local or regional effects. Others, such as those in India and Russia, will not produce surprising outcomes. Others still could have significant foreign policy implications. For example, the result of the recent elections in Taiwan could affect relations between China and the United States, while those in Iran could affect the trajectory of the Israel-Hamas conflict and lead to commodity price spillovers.

The upcoming European elections are also crucial as they will decide the composition of the EU parliament at a time when far right parties are on the rise and the bloc is becoming increasingly polarised.

The US elections are likely to have the greatest impact on the world’s political and economic outlook. The return of former president Donald Trump could affect the global economy in three main ways:

The first is through increased pressure on the Federal Reserve – the US central bank – and unconventional fiscal policies (tax and public spending). Although Trump’s pushing for interest rate cuts could harm the disinflationary process, his unconventional tax cuts could put even more pressure on fiscal balances through higher deficits. His proposed policy of imposing 10% tariffs on all imported goods could further disrupt supply chains and have a significant impact on US GDP and household wellbeing, particularly if trade partners retaliate (Lee, 2023).

Trump’s position on foreign policy and security issues, particularly regarding NATO, could alter global power dynamics. And regardless of the election outcome, the US political system is becoming increasingly dysfunctional, and citizens’ trust in political and social institutions has reached historically low levels.

However, given the potential risks, is there a need for reform of the established macroeconomic framework to address global challenges more effectively?

The existing consensus on the macroeconomic framework includes free movement of goods and capital, rule-based fiscal policies, independent central banks with a focus on inflation targeting, public institutions that prioritise maintaining financial stability, and international institutions for financial supervision and increased cooperation between countries.

Abandoning this framework may not be desirable, as the global economy has benefited from a private sector-based model, and the evolution of these institutions is based on internationally agreed laws and agreements.

But incremental reforms that could strengthen the international consensus are necessary due to the increased likelihood of geopolitical risks, the fragmentation of global markets and the climate-related risks that the global economy faces. These include designing central bank mandates and fiscal rules to respond to shocks more flexibly, revamping international institutions such as the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism, and improving the process of consensus-building.

Everyone knows the manner in which Lord Jesus was killed.  He wrote The Bible at an early age for a better life for human beings.  But people were not content with his peace lessons. They purposefully did not want a peaceful life and finally they killed him. So, his soul is not at peace and is extremely angry. Lord Jesus then decided to put thoughts of war and terrorism in their minds. Accordingly, men are indulging in war and terrorism and creating bloodshed.  It has been found that the blood of human beings is sucked daily by Lord Jesus for the past two thousand years.  Now Lord Jesus' soul has become peaceful and he desires to change his Red Cross which was given by these people to him into a Green Cross. I have already published a book titled ‘In-Diadem World’ and have therein mentioned these desires of Lord Jesus in the Chapter “Secrets of Jesus”.

I hereby strongly warn these trouble mongers to please change Lord Jesus’, Red Cross into Green Cross.  Or else, the thoughts of war and terrorism will continue to reign the human mentality and on a daily basis people will meet their deaths by manufacturing new weapons with modern technology. I have already got approval to publish this matter from Lord Jesus.

 

 

 

Impressum

Texte: Gopal Koleakr
Bildmaterialien: Gopal Kolekar
Cover: Gopal Kolekar
Lektorat: Gopal Kolekar
Tag der Veröffentlichung: 06.11.2024

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Widmung:
According to the eons, the world has been changing. The last Mahābhārata epic was at the end of the Dvapara Yuga, just before the onset of the Kali Yuga. According to the Puranic scripts, this would place the events of the Mahābhārata around 3102 BCE. Historical and archaeological attempts to date the Mahābhārata events have resulted in a wide range of estimates, generally spanning from the 12th century BCE to the 8th century BCE. The differences arise from interpretations of astronomical data, linguistic analysis, and other archaeological findings. Major themes of the Mahābhārata: 1. Dharma (Duty): A central theme is the concept of dharma, or duty, and its complexities in various situations. 2. Politics and Power: The epic explores themes of leadership, governance, and the use and abuse of power. 3. Family and Conflict: It delves into familial relationships, loyalty, betrayal, and the consequences of actions. In the 21st Century Mahābhārata also there are similar problems which